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INTRODUCTION 
I. STATElllENT OF THE PROBLSM 
The courts' acceptance since 1890 of a right of pri-
vacy as the basis for redreaa to one injured by publication 
· has presented a new problem to the preas. The interest of 
the individual in protecting hie privacy must inevitably 
conflict with the intereat of the public in receiving news. 
It is tho objective, the duty of the press, to enlighten and 
inform the public on matters of community and social inter-
est. Can this be done in harmony with the individual's 
right of privacy? 
It will be the purpose of this thesis to investigate 
the law of privacy as it affects communications. 
The method of study will be to inquire into and ana-
lyze the cases involving violations of the right of privacy 
in order to illustrate the various principles on which a 
complaint of invasion of privacy can be made. 
For example, most of the oases are based on a breach 
of contract, either expressed or implied, such as the breach 
of an implied contract on the part of a photographer to 
print only such pictures as may be ordered by his subject, 
and not to print others and use them for purposes of adver-
tising with copyright implications. Others are based upon 
the breach of a trust or confidence which one placed in or 
.;: -· 
vi 
, gave another. Others recognise a property right in private 
. letters and private writing• which will not permit their 
·publication without consent. 
In others, the publication is so nearly akin to a 
libel that final conclusions could be supported under the 
law of libel without invoking the doctrine of the right of 
i privacy. 
vii 
II • BACKGROUND Olo' THE FliOBLil:llll 
Prior to the year 1890, no English or American court 
·had recognized a "right of privacy" in connection with pub-
lication of letters, portraits or the like, although relief 
had been afforded concerning such publication on the basis 
of defamation, or breach of confidence, or of an implied 
contract. 
In that year Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis 
presented in an article in 4 Harvard Law Revis! 193 entitled 
"The Right to Privacy" the argument that there existed a 
principle broader in scope than the ones previously pro-
tecting the individual from undesirable publicity. 'fhis 
principle was stated to be the right of a private individual 
to be let alone and not subject to unauthorized publicity in 
his essentially private affairs. The article stated: 
Of the desirability--indeed of the necessity--or some 
such protection there can, it is believed, be no doubt. 
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious 
bounds of property and of decency. Gossip is no longer 
the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has 
become a trade which 1s pursued w:t th indus try as well as 
effrontery •••• When personal gossip attains the dignity 
of print, and crowds the apace available for matters of 
real interest to the community, what wonder that the 
ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative importance. 
These are harsh words against the field of communica• 
tions, the press in particular. Yet, these are the wards 
that set the precedent for the courts' recognition of inva-
"" lion of privacy as cause for action. It was left to the 
·; .;.;;::.-.:==-::·.-..;.;=;:--
viii 
test of time and individual caaes to affirm the existence of 
the right of privacy and of the tort of invasion of privacy. 
Court after court, following the article by Brandeis 
and Warren, granted relief on the grounds of invasion of pri~ 
vacy, bringing actual recognition of the right, to date, 
into 21 states and the District of Columbia with the ques~ 
tion left open in other states, but at least not denied. 
Only three states at the present time--Wisconsin, Rhode 
Island, and New York--consistently and clearly deny the 
existence of common law right of privacy. 
- -··- -· --·---· ·.,-----::=.:o::--.~.---c:- __ ., _______ _ 
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III. PURPOSE OF' THE S'fUDY 
A knowledge of what constitutes the invasion of pri-
vacy is indispensable to the journalist who, in fulfilling 
his obligation to inform and educate society on matters of 
public interest, is constantly in danger of violating the 
individual rights of the members of this society. 
1~e investigation and analyais will aim at providing 
the fundamental knowledge needed by the journalist to pre-
vent violation of the right of privacy and make possible the 
coexistence of an untrammeled press as a vital source of 
public information an an individual's right to be let 
alone. 
It will be the objective of this study to: 
A. Make a thorough investigation of the adjudicated 
cases involving a violation of the right of 
privacy; and 
B, Summarise what in the past has constituted an 
invasion of privacy in the field of communi-
cations, and what has been the reasoning on 
which the court judgments have been based, 
:: 
C'RAP'l'ER I 
lUS'l'ORY OF TRS RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
I. DiVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
IN THE EI GHTEDTH C!SN'l'URY 
'the right of privacy ia not ao recent in origin aa 
many atudiea attribute it to be. Th~ugh the article by 
Warren and Brandeis 1n 1890 ayntheaized tor the first t !me 
the whole oa teaorr of legal rights called "privacy, 11 and 
literally outlined a new field ot jurisprudence, the recog-
nition ot an lndlvldual'a right to be let alone had been in 
existence in the oommon law judgment& tor many decades. 
The diatlnguiahing factor in the 1890 article, in 
tact, the point that the two authors were empbaa1z1ng, waa 
the need to daflnltaly provide le~al protection tor this 
right of privacy and not to continue defending ita 1nvaa1on 
on other legal t1ct1ona, aa was tha procedure at Bngl1ah 
common law. The real 1nteraat involved in c privacy 1nva-
aion was, according to the authora, the i.nterest of person-:: 
alit: rather than property. 
Aa early aa 1741, equity courts were protecting tha 
right of a peraon to keep his lettera from being published 
unwarrantedly; however, the protection was given for his 
prpperty 1n the letters and not tor hie right to protect hla 
personal feeling a. 
~----- ,--=--4-=--·.:;·:.:.= ... ~.;;;:-;;: -; 
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Criminal law was protecting the right of privacy in 
·. some respects also in these early courts. Eavesdropping waa 
::an indictable nuisance at co111111on law--though the relief was 
'baaed in a trespass and not in an injury to the person. 
'l'hese early equity court recogni tiona, though never 
recognizing the existence of the right of privacy "per se," 
! did bring up the question so pertinent to the study at hand--
• the question of publication rights. These first cases were 
<primarily actions for recognizing a writer's absolute owner-
' ship of his crea tiona, whether they be literary works or 
personal letters. The decisions in these cases have direct 
bearing on the development of the right to publish or not to 
: publish as it axil ts today in r alation to a person 1 s pri-
vacy. For, the precedent set in these early common law dis-
.• putea regarding one 1 a right to keep his feelings and thoughts 
from public scrutiny were the basis for the evolution of the 
right of privacy as it is recognized today. 
One of the first and most famous of the early cases 
was Pope v. Curl. In this caae the famous writer, Alexander 
Pope, asked for an injunction to restrain publication of a 
l book entitled Lettera From Swift. Pope and Othera. Pops, 
as the plaintiff, maintained that the letters were of no 
literary value since they contained only personal facts and 
1Pope v. Curl, 2 ATI 346 26 Eng. Reprint 608 (1741) 
:: 
!:' 
3 
:; were reflections which Pope conddered private, The defend-
:: ant argued that the letter, once sent, was the same as a 
gift and could be disposed of as the recipient wanted. Al-
though the court in no way acknowledged Pope's feelings that 
his private thoughts would be violated by publication of the 
letters, it did establish two principles still maintained in 
,; today's courts on questions of publishing personal letters. 
The Lord Chancellor held (1) that the publication of 
a letter was the exclusive right of the author, and (2) that 
a recipient of a letter had only a special property--the 
paper--and could not publish the contents of the paper with-
out consent. 2 
These principles were brought up a~ain 30 years later 
and were cited in a decision which closely paralleled the 
Pope case. In this instance the question was whether or not 
the writings of a deceased person could be published without 
the consent of the executor of the deeeaaed 1 s estate, al-
though the letters themselves had long been the property of 
another party. Publication without consent was again denied 
on the precedent set in the Pope v. Curl case.3 
A problem thet is today one of major consideration 
for the collllllunieator is the question of first publication. 
tng. 
)thomson v. Stanhope Ambleer 737 (1774.hl 
= -·. ~"=·" .... -Jl.-=,~c---==·cc.c7e·=~=·=c.=o="·· 
. :;. 
4 
Who is entitled to first publish a private paper, and after 
this first publication, who then may publish it? 
The two cases cited above established the authority 
of first publication to belong to the author. In a subse-
4 
quent case in 1769, Millar v. Taylor, it was decided that 
an author's work, ones published, was no longer his private 
property but was subject to public inspection without 
further consent, 
Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century there 
co~lu be observed in the action of the common law courts a 
beginning of the evolution of the right of privacy, 
4aurrows, Rep 2303 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
IN THE IIINE'l'EENTH CENTURY 
The evolution of the right of privacy continued into 
,, the nineteenth century, during which still another factor 
pertinent to the question of what could be published against 
the will of an individual was added. This addition was the 
defense tor publishing private letters on the grounds of 
vindicating one's actions or character. 
In the case of Gee v. Pritchard, in 1818. the widow 
ot a wealthy man brought a bill to restrain the publication 
of some letters abe had written to her late husband's son by 
a previous marriage. The son had made copies of the letters, 
and when a dispute over the deceased's estate began, the 
original letters (but not the copies) were returned to the 
widow. The son then proceeded to publish the reproductions 
on the grounds that he needed to affirm some facts of his 
character and actions. The injunction was asked by the 
widow on the grounds that her feelings were seriously 
injured by the publication of her private thoughts. The 
action was sustained; however, not on the grounds of injured 
feelings, but rather on the grounds of property rights. 
The Lord Chancellor, basing his decision on the case of 
Pope v. Curl, said: 
Taking into consideration the fact that original 
letters had been returned to the author, no property 
" 
,, 
0'-"t- .. 
6 
of the plaintiff could be injured if it were not for the 
fictitious ro art in the writer's thou hta aenti-
ments6 emotions and feelings. owever •••• because of 
LOrd hancellor ~ldon's dictum on feelings in the Pope 
caae) ••• I will relieve you from that argument. The 
question here will be whether th~ bill has stated facta 
ot which it ia bound to respect.> 
In thia seemingly outright avoidance of the isaue by 
, recognizing the presence of injuries in "thoughts, senti-
menta, emotions and feelings," and yet immediately passing 
ott these poaaesaiona aa "fictitious prop~rty," the prece-
dent was set for nearly a hundred years of rulings in which 
no relief would be given on an unjust, unwarranted publica-
tion unless more than injury to one's personal being could 
:~ be ea tablished. 
In reality, the fictions were the bases on which pro• 
tection for the right of privacy was granted up to the day 
when demand for legal recognition of the right was made in 
, concrete terms in the Warren and Brandeis article. ;I 
Until that time, relief was granted tor invasion of 
privacy on every ground~ the actual violation of the 
right of privacy. 
In addition to the property right which afforded pro-
tection for a person's right to be let alone, another legal 
fiction was established--a breach of trust. 
6 In the case of Yovatt v. Winyard, in 1820, a man 
S2 Swanat 402, at 414 (Underlining not in original) 
61 MacN & G 29 (1849) 41 Eng. Reprint 1171 
. """- "~·--··· ·--- -::;-;-=".:;::---::;-;:::-.=~-~-==---= 
wae Peetra1ned by injunction from communicating or aelling 
medicine recipea which he had copied while working •• an 
employee tor the plaintiff. The inJunction ••• laaued on 
the baele of the manner in which the pecipe wae obtained, 
not on the tact that the plaintiff 1 a privacy had been 
invaded, even Vhough the latter reaaon was the one entered 
as cause tor the inJunct! on. 
7 
'l'o designate aa a breach of t:ruat a violation which 
was pPeaented aa an invasion of pplvacy by the plaintiff 
illuatpatea again the efforta ot the Sngliah common law 
court to confine the baa1a for relief to precedent eatab-
Uahed in law. Although the court 1 a reascmtn~~: might have 
been more nearly correct than the analyala of the plaintiff, 
the noteworthy point waa the retuaal of the court to even 
correct the plaintiff'• plea, and to treat it as one which 
had, in the beginning, been entered as a breach of t:ruat. 
Paralleling this caae five yeara later was another 
plea tor protection of one 1a right to be let alone which the 
common law court again retuaed to recognize as auch, but 
ra~er aet yet another fiction to give reliaf--thia time 
•vtolatlon ot contract• waa aubatltuted tor invasion of 
pri· .. oy. 
A aurgeon aaked a reetraint against the publication 
•. ot a book which contained aoma leotul'ea he bad given from 
·-~·--······-
·-~-::.-:.===~-==---::;._.~ 
memory as a speaker at a university.? He asked for the 
injunction in order to protect his "sentiments and ideas." 
8 
However, the restraint was issued on a violation of contract 
and property right. The contract violation, according to 
Lord Eldon, was in the fact that the students could take 
;i notes for their own use, but not for prof1 t. The property 
existed in the ideas and language of the surgeon's lecture, 
evan though they had not been reduced to print, 
This case is interesting not only because it produced 
an additional substitute in common law for protection of 
one's privacy, but because it mentioned for the first time 
publication for profit. This latter consideration became 
the basis for statutory law in the twentieth century, statu-
tory law concerning the right of privacy, as will be seen in 
a later discussion, 
With the legal path so distinctly drawn in every 
direction around a recognition of even the existence of 
individual privacy, much leas a right to it, one might sur-
mise that the courts were actually quite aware of the exist-
ence of privacy but were purposely not incorporating it into 
the common law. 
Actually, it took a complaint of the British Royal 
" family to provide the impetus that brought the word 
7Albernathy v. Hutchison, LJ (o.s.) Ch 2091 H&T 28 
(1825) 
9 
""privacy," and its meaning to the individual, into the 
court'• record, When the Queen's popular Prince Consort, 
Prince Albert, defined an injustice to him as a violation of 
,
1
his "privacy," the court was quick to repeat the definition 
'and also to refer to the problem in terms of privacy. 
In Prince Albert v. Strange,8 the violation consisted 
of the intended publication of some etchings and drawings 
, which belonged to Prince Albert, along with a catalogue 
describing the art. The publication was planned by a former 
employee of the Royal couple who had procured impressions ot 
the drawings and intended to exhibit them along w1 th "A 
Descriptive Catalogue of the Royal Victoria and Prince Albert 
; Gallery of Etchings. 11 
Prince Albert immediately entered his claim, not on 
; "right of property, 11 but on the tact the t he had the right 
to make public the etchings, and that the publication of the 
catalogue interfered with that right, thereby invading his 
' 
private life and that or the Queen. 
Presiding Lord Cottenham pacified the confines of 
"precedent by granting relief on the grounds that there was 
enough property right violated, as well as breach of trust, 
confidence and contract; and, at laat, he admitted also that 
·a new consideration had appeared. He stated that the Prince 
8Kacedon, etc. 1 MacH & G 29 Eng Reprint 1171 {1849) 
... -. ;;-:;_::;_-: -
•: Consort was anti tled to be protected in the exclusive use 
and enjoyment of~ which~ exclusivelv hl!· 
The Court said: 
10 
In the present case, where privacy is the right 
invaded, postponing the injunction would be equivalent 
to denying it altogether, The interposition of this 
court in these eases does not depend on aqy legal :right, 
and to be effectual it must be immediate,Y 
This is the first straightforward court declaration 
of the principles tnat: 
(l) There is a right called the ":right of privacy." 
(2) The court of equity will protect this right of 
injunction. 
(3) The protection of a right of privacy by a court 
of equity does not depend upon such a right at 
COIII!fton law. 
In other words, precedent was foregone in favor of 
the Royal couple, end a new era of recognition of the right 
of privacy was started on its way. 
The next notable case, interestingly, was one in the 
United States, the first in this country to bring the ques-
tion of privacy to the foreground. This case concerned the 
publication of letters of a deceased person. 
In Gigsby v. Breckinridge,lO in 1867, a girl was 
given a collection of letters by her dying mother. Among 
lOKy (2 Bush) 480 (1867) 
11 
the collection were aeveral from the mother's second husband. 
To restrain the girl from publishing the letters, the second 
husband sought an injunction. The court enjoined only those 
letters written by him. This was mainly a question of prop-
erty right, although a significant precedent was established. 
The dissenting opinion of the court noted that as a wife can-
not have separate excluaive property right in letters; her 
poaaeaeions were to be regarded as her husband's legal poe-
sessions. To violate this poaaeaaion would be not only an 
infringement of property right, but of the right to be let 
alone. Also, the point was made that the general property 
belongs to the writer, the special property to the receiver, 
and when the latter dies, all property then reverts to the 
writer. 11 
The above observation of the dissenting opinion is 
interesting in that it mentions for the first time the fact 
that relations between husband and wife are entitled to 
privacy12--a principle which was developed into the common 
law of both privacy and libel in later years. 
From the review of the preceding cases it can be seen 
that privacy is not a contrivance of modern times. It was 
entered as a plea time and again at British common law, but 
was given relief consistently on other grounds. The article 
11Ibid. 
-
12!12!§.. 
12 
' by Warren and Brandeis in 1890 waa the beginning of the in-
creasing demand to recognize the right of privacy as a aole 
:: 
basis for redress in the courtroom,l3 
The Warren and Brandeis article pointed out that the 
protection afforded in the past to authors of letters was 
the protection of their sentiments and thoughts and, there-
fore, actually was an enforcement or the right to be let 
alone, The authors insisted that the principle which pro-
tected a person's letters, as well as other personal produc-
tiona, not only against theft and approbation, but also 
against publication, was not the principle or private prop-
erty, but that of an inviolate personal1t:. 14 
What is personality sa diatinguiahed from personal 
property? 
Warren and Brandeis did not define this, but they 
indica ted that anything that the personal! ty had been, done 
or produced during ita existence is essentially a part of it, 
Physical things that are produced and set aside are 
property, but, the authors contend, anything that is not set 
aside, such as utterances, drawings, letters, or other ere-
ations which do not quite reach the stage of property, may 
and should be considered a part of the peraonal1 ty " ••• in 
:t its fullest integrity."l5 
Rev 353 
-- =i==" 
:I 
lJ4 Harvard Law Review 198 (1890) 
l$Kacedan "The Right of Privacy," 
l4Ibid. 
(1932) 12 Boa UL 
~~~- ~"·=" .. , .. , ... ,~~• cococc- .cc .. -~ .• ····~ • • · • • 
" 
" 
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:; 
'fhe article criticised the courts of the past for 
protecting the right or privacy on legal fictions, saying 
that neither those nor present remedies (referring to 
13 
actions tor libel and slander) were adequate protection for 
a person against thoughtless and malicious acts of another. 
These acta could now be carried out by perfect strangers, 
owing to the inventions or modern communication methods 
which make poasible the taking or a photograph on the sly. 
Therefore, the principles which had been aufficient to pro-
:i 
i! teet privacy in the past were in esaence "outdated," tor 
charges or breach of trust, confidence and contract cer-
tainly could not be brought againat a stranger. 
The resistance of the courts to legal recognition or 
the privacy doctrine was not the sole object of criticism in 
the authors' article. They contended that the reason the 
courts so desperately needed to abandon their obstinate 
stand was the rise of what actually has since become known 
as "yellow journalism." The contention was that the supply 
, created the demand. The publications or society were becom-
ing such out and out examples of the constant violation of 
an individual's right to lead a lite uninvaded by public 
scrutiny that legal action was needed to deter, if not to 
stop, this new form of journalism. The authors said: 
To occupy the indolent, 
with idle gossip which can 
upon the domestic circle. 
column upon column is filled 
only be procured by intrusion 
The intensity and complexity 
--·-:::·=-. _,;-;:::;;==-==---=--:-::-:.:=-·--·-· ,-:;_ 
of life, attending upon advancing civilization, have 
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, 
under the refining influence of culture, has become more 
sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy 
have become more essential to the individual! but modern 
enterprise and invention have, through invaslons upon 
his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress 
far greiter than could be inflicted by mere bodily 
injury. 6 
Though Brandeis' and Warren's article did much to 
bring the doctrine of the right or privacy into judicial 
recognition, it did not diminish the growth of the goaaip-
j 
,, ing, inquiring newspaper colunm aimed at increasing circula-
,, 
tion even at the cost of individual seclusion, As "yellow 
journalism" gained momentum, the subjects of its unrelenting 
:! ,, 
'i prying began to take their complaints to the courts, These 
complaints were filed on their proper basis, an invasion of 
privacy, and for the first time the courts began to give 
relief on that ground. 
16 Warren and Brandeis, ~· ~· 
• 
:: -
~~ '"~~, =="-;;~~=.~~.~"· ·==~ ~ 
""' III. RECOGNITION OF TH!i: RIGHT OF' PRIVACY 
IN THE '.I'WENTIETH C!SNTURY 
In 1902 the first case was brought before the courts 
in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company, in the state 
ot New York. Although the right or privacy was recognized 
by the two lower courts, the Court or Appeals refused relief 
on what it termed would be "litigation bordering on the 
absurd" if the right or privacy were recognized. This deci-
sion met w1 th a o much public opposition that it eventually 
led to the passing of a statute on the doctrine. This, how-
ever, will be taken up in a later discussion (Chapter II, 
New York Statute on Commercial Approbation). Suffice to say 
,, here that although denied recognition, the right of privacy 
had at least reached the courts as a sole cause for action. 
The next appearance of a protest to an invasion of 
privacy tared better and was, in fact, recognized by the 
Supreme Court of Georgia in 1904.17 Other jurisdictions 
followed, with recognition co•ing in the Louisiana courts 
the next year. 18 In the latter case, the violation was in 
the taking of the picture of a person accused of crime. The 
court held that the accused person does not have to submit 
to police photography for rogue's gallery exhibition so long 
17 Pav•a1ch v, ~England~ Insurance~ .• 122 Ga 
;I 19o, (1904> 
' 
18Kacedan "The R;lght p
2
r4Pri vacy, 
11 citing Fora tar 
I Mj 1 burn Jl.c.. v. cf,1 nn, 134 Ky 4 
- ----·--·--- - ···ft----····~ . -····· -· ··----- -·----- . ··---
16 
:[as he is innocent. The court's statement was: 
II 
' Anyone who does not violate the law can insist upon 
being let1tlone, In such a case the ri~ht of privacy is absolute. Y 
Four years after this decision the Kentucky Supreme 
Court recognized privacy and illustrated definitely that the 
law of libel or slander ia not enough to protect one's feel-
ings in particular instances. In the case of Foster Milburn 
' <l2_, v. Chinn20 the precedent was set for redress in the vio-
lation of one's right of privacy associated with advertising. 
'l'he American courts were acknowledging the need for 
the recognition of the right of an individual to live a life 
of seclusion and anonymity, free from prying curiosity. 
This need was growing out of the commercialization of 
life in general, the development of raster, more comprehen-
sive communication systems, the increase in population in 
' fast growing communities and cities. But even more point-
edly, the need was created by the unwarranted, annoying, and 
often harmfUl, publicity given a person of fame or notoriety 
by the circulation-eager newspapers of the new era. 
The press continued reporting ita sensational inquir-
ies and probings into private lives, aearcely heeding the 
proteate of the individual whose name, life or portrait was 
presented for public acrutiny, appraisal and criticism. 
l9Kacedan, "The Ri~ht of Privacy," citing Itzkovitch 
v. Whitaker, 115 La 479, 481 
20Ibid. 
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The new fiat--the right of privacy--that was being shaken at 
the press, at advertising, and at other forms of communica-
tion, received leas recognition from these media than from 
the courts. This was an unfortunate mistake for the fast-
growing communications media to make, for the press in par-
ticular, because the more frequent the violations, the 
' louder were the protests and the greater the number of cases 
'i 
carried to the courts. And, as more and more protests to 
v1olat1.ons of the 1nd1vidual's right of privacy were sus-
tained, the more the doctrine was establishing itself as a 
future 1rremed1al limitation on CO!Ill!!Untcations. The media 
were careful of violations of contract, trust, property 
right, et cetera, but these did not prohibit what was often 
their most successful mode of reporting--sifting from an 
individual's life the particles of personal gossip which 
promised to quench the thirst of curiosity and which simul-
taneously would raise circulation figures, Unfortunately, 
the communications media had not taken notice of the pro-
phetic statement of an American judge in 1894 who smd~ 
The fact that redress 1a afforded for viola tlon of 
the right of privacy where some other legally protected 
interest (such as the right of property, personal safety 
or reputation) is infringed upon, is in itself signifi-
cant. The treatment of any element of damage as ~ para-
sitic factor beloaga essentially to a transitory stage 
of legal evolution. A factor which ie today recognized 
as parasitic, will tomorrow be recognized as an inde-
pendent basis of liability,2l 
21138 American &!! Reports 401 
=---::-::.":;;:----==-~-~-·-"·-:-=;-:-:-.--:~":----:::::o:.=:;-.-.:=:::::-.~=--==;~_;:--,;=.;;:;-:---.­
; 
18 
The "tomorrow" predicted by Judge Nordbye in the above 
statement, when the parasite would become the independent 
; basis of liability, dawned much earlier than ita almost 
three-century struggle could predict. The la~ which always 
existed between wrong and remedy was being eliminated by the 
social forces which, while refining the law to the culture 
and age, were also making the society more seneitive to inju-
ries and increasing the need tor protection.22 
The "eavesdropper" punishable by criminal law in the 
early colll.lll.on law was taking a new form in society through 
the development of mass communications--a form which could 
reach a mass audience each day with the true account of an 
individual's personal affairs, disturbing his mental peace 
and comfort and producing annoyance and acute suffering. 
Society rose to meet this new intruder with the same demands 
i it had made in coping w1 th the early eavesdropper--legal 
recognition of an individual's right to be let alone and 
protection of this right in the courts. However, the right 
:! was now recognized not as the parasite of another legal 
., 
redress, but as "an independent basis of liability." 
The tear of Lord Eldon in ~ v. Pritchard in 1818 
that recognition of a right of privacy, where there had been 
no previous recognition, would "justify the reproach that 
22138 American ~ Reports 411 
19 
the equity of the court varies as the Chancellor's foot," 
• was in part realized during the first decades of the new 
': century. 23 Recognition of 1he right from state to state was 
'! 
as varied as the number of cases testing the doctrine. The 
demand of society to gain protection against the new eaves-
dropper was rejected as often as it was accepted. But the 
important aspect was that the doctrine, 'whether accepted or 
rejected, was at last entering the courts as a separate and 
independent cause for action. 
In the decade between 1938 and 1948 the campaign for 
recognition of the right of privacy showed consistent vic-
,, tories. During this period nine states gave the right 
explicit recognition for the first time. Also, a broader 
application was given the doctrine when two states, New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania, recognised that the basis of the 
concept was not in property, as had formerly been held. 24 
During this decade the courts were not alone in 
increasing interest in, and giving recognition to, the 
doctrine. The field of communications, which had been the 
object of the greatest percentage of actions alleging inva-
sion of privacy--by the press, in advertising, 1n books, in 
motion pictures, and more and more frequently by radio--was 
23~ •• citing 2 Swanst 402 at 414 
24Feinberg, "Recent Developments in the Right of 
f" Privacy," 48 ~ L. ~· 712 
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' beginning to take a atand on this new right which was being 
promoted as a limitation on comment. Was this new doctrine 
a limi ta t1 on on freedom or speech and the press--a freedom 
, guaranteed by the Conati tution? 
"Yes!" was the cry of the now right-of-privacy-aware 
:1 communicators. 
However, this cry of "unconstitutional" by the media 
appeared redundant when a majority of the courts decided in 
':favor of the right ot privacy by recognizing its basis in 
!i 
'i Constitutional right. 2.5 'l'he right of men to pursue and 
•1 possess happiness and to be free from unlawful seizure or 
search was cited as Constitutional support of an individual's 
' 
:! 
right to be let alone. 
A dilemma seemed to appear, a dilemma which remains 
today in the question of which guarantee of the Constitution 
should be dominant. Unabridged speech is demanded by the 
! communicators, ~ alao by the people--the aame people who 
:demand to be let alone. 'l'he anawer seems to lie in the 
' simple obeervation of Judge Howard in hi& comments in 138 
1 American Law Review: 
' -
' 
As the right or privacy is not without qualifi~e­
tions, neither is freedom of the press unlimited. 
:: He added that the right or privacy undoubtedly ill!pinges upon 
;i abeo1ute freedom of speech and of the press, and it also 
d 
:1---~--
2.5138 American Law Review 414 
, 
26138 American ~ Review 422 
."~74'-=•oc·-=•,~o~==~-- ... -
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:i 
" clashea with the interest of the public in having tree dis-
semination of news and information. The paramount public 
interest must be taken into consideration when the necessary 
i limitations are put on the right of privacy. 
Commenting on privacy as based in the Constitution, 
· the presiding .1udge in a 1922 11 tigat!on said: 
Even if constitutional provisions recognized in the 
abstract a right of privacy and suggest to the courts a 
general policy, there is little support that these pro-
visions have the effect of guaranteeing this specific 
right to individuals. It has been said by the Supreme 
Court that the Federal Conatitution does not confer any 
right of priJICY that is beyond the power of the States 
to restrict. -, 
Support is given this opinion in an article in a u.s. 
,: Law Review which mildly cri tici:ud the reasoning of the 
courts in baaing the right of privacy on the declaration of 
! rights in reapect to the pursuit of happiness. 26 In a till 
'! 
·: another law review it is stated w1 th further reference to 
this constitutional defense that "neither clause Lreferring 
to pursuit of happiness and freedom from seisure:rordinarily 
:has been interpreted as conferring personal rights on an 
individual as against other individuals. They rather have 
·been construed as limitations on governmental action alone." 29 
' 
:11922 
I; 
Constitutional authority received further criticism 
27Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 u.s. 5307 
2870 u.s. Law Review 440 
--29138 American ~ Review 422 
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ii u fiction for relhf. Leon Green, in his article on the 
! 
'! 
1 right of privacy, states: 
~ i 
·i 
i 
i' 
Attributing the right of privacy to a constitutional 
basis shows a desire to provide respectable dress for a 
newcomer. It is a manifestation of the same conserva-
tism as appears in deciaions giving effect to the right 
of privacy under the guise of property rights, etc. 
There would sesm to be no necessity for ascribing the 
right of privacy to any fictitious basis. It is not a 
mere parasitic appendage. Its violation is actionable 
because it is a wrong which the courts have come to 
recognize as such, and for ~ioh they afford a remedy, 
as for any tort, just as they did in an earlier age in 
cases of assault, libel and slander.3U 
Constitutional authority, then, is not always acknowl-
edged ss the basia for protection of one's privacy, just as 
it is not an unqualified protection of the press. Freedom 
of the press guaranteed by the Constitution is not freedom 
to invade rights of others; and the right of privacy is not 
the unlimited right to seclusion when public interest and 
need for information are vital. 
These two principles--freedom of speech and the right 
of privacy--have fought each other more and more frequently 
in the courts. They first claahed in the eighteenth century. 
Since then the right of an individual to be let alone has 
reached its present status where it no longer is "a para-
sitic appendage," but is a right having distinct judicial 
recogni t1on. 
3°Leon Green, "The Right of Privacy," 27 ill Law 
Review 237 
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' 
Justice Barnhill, in Flake v. Greenaboro, stated: 
In respect to it (the right of privacy) the courts 
are plowing new ground and before the field is fully 
developed unquestionably perplexing and3~rrasalng stumps and runners will be encountered. 
23 
One of the first "stumps" was the court's reluctance 
to grant recognition. A still quite unrelenting "runner" is 
the mass communications medium. Its desire to fulfill the 
public demand and desire for news and information often 
pushes it headlong into violating an individual's treasured 
seclusion. 
The development of the law thus tar, and the implica-
tions of the preo~dents set in the adjudicated oases of this 
'i country are the beat indication of the future of the right 
,, 
" ·,of privacy and of its effect on the field of cOIIIIItunications. 
,, 
31212 N. C. 780 
CHAPTEll II 
THE NEW YORK CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 
I. RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
IK THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
Since the demand by Warren and Brandeis for judicial 
recognition of the right of privacy, New York State has con-
:isiatently denied any such right at coll!Uion law, The Hew York 
, jurisdiction is for this reason dis tinct from all others in 
·a study of the right of privacy--for while refusing recogni-
tion of the right at common law, relief for violation of the 
right is granted under atatutory law. The New York Civil 
·.Rights Law, Section .50 and .51, 1a the only statutory recog-
nition of a right of privacy existing in a state where there 
is no common law recognition of the right. 1 
Although the cases charging invasion of privacy which 
have entered the New York courts could appear with cases 
from other jurisdictions illustrating similar violations, 
,i.e., unwarranted publicity, use of name, use of photograph, 
:•i t would be more valuable to examine the New York cases 
.• separately. The reason for thia ia: 
(A) Cases tried under atatutory law are decided 
i! 
'i w1 thin strict, defined l1m1 ta tiona not 
:! 
l138 !merican ~Reports (A,L.R.) 34 
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always existing in common law decisions; and 
(B) Cases seeking relief under the New York statute 
must show a commercial approbation and are 
therefore distinctly set apart from cases in 
other jurisdictions which allow relief for 
damage to "feelings" alone, 
New York was the first to respond to th'! article by 
Warren and Brandeis in 1902. That year, in the case of 
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company,2 there appeared 
to be acceptance of the article by two lower courts. How-
ever, when the case was appealed, the higher court refused 
relief mainly for lack of precedent and for fear of setting 
a precedent which would in the future be regarded as "absurd. nj 
The case concerned the publishing of a lithographic 
picture of a girl without her consent to advertise the flour 
products of the Franklin Mills Flour Company. On the adver-
tisement she was labeled as "Flour of the Family" with the 
names of both defendants--the Franklin Mills and the Folding 
Box Companies--printed beneath the picture, The circulation 
of 2$,000 reproductions, without any consent from the girl 
caused her "great distress and auftering both in mind and 
., body" due to the jeers and scotf1ngs of friends who recog-
' 
,i nized her picture in the advertisement. For these reasons 
ij 
:! 
!i 271 N,Y, $38 (1902) 3Ib1d,, 539 
.... -::_;;::_:::==.::::·=~-. 
i! she enter&d a plea for damsg&s of $'1,,000 plus enjotl'l!llent of 
;j further reproduction. of the picture. 
i 
,! The lower courts 1 decision to recogn:tz.~ t'1e right of 
rl plaintiff was reversed by Justice Parker in the Court of 
Appeals, The Justice dwelled on the consequences of setting 
future precedents which he felt would prove embarrassing when 
arising from an "extrema" such as the case before htm. 
If such a principle be incorporated into the body of 
law through the instrumentality of a court of equity, 
the attempts to logically apply the principle will 
necessarily result not only in a vast amount of litiga-
tion, but in litigation bordering on the absurd, for the 
right of privacy, once establhhed as a legal doctrine, 
cannot be confined to the restraint of the publication 
of a likeness, but must necessarily embrace as well the 
publication of word picture, a comment upon one's looks, 
conduct, domestic rela tiona or habits. And, were the 
right of privacy once legally asserted, it would neces-
sarily be held to include the same things if spoken 
instead of printed. I have gone only fs.r enough to 
barely suggest the vast field of litigation which would 
necessarily be opened up should this court hold thet 
privacy exists as a legal right enforceable in equity by 
injunction, and by da~agea where they seem necessary to 
give complete relief,4 
This prediction, as to the numerous forms a violstion 
of privacy might be based upon if once recognized by the 
courts as cauae for action, was ~ell founded, although at 
the time the judge's decision was held to be outrageous by 
: the general public. 
·i il 
! ,, 
! 
As a result of the Court or Appeals' negative deci-
sion to grant relief for an invasion of privacy, the~ 
4rbid., 54o 
:I 27 
'I 
/1 ~ Times carried a aeries of articles condemning the ab-i! 
li aence of justice in the Court's reasoning. Public opinion 
;[ 
il 
'i 
" 
forcefully supported the view of the Times, resulting in the 
passage of the New York Civil Rights Law, Sections 50 and 
51.5 
This statute, although the direct result of opposi-
tion to Judge Parker's decision, actually incorporated much 
or the judge 1 s reasoning, The a ta tu te even followed his 
1 suggestion that: 
The legislative body could very well interfere and 
arbitrarily provide that no one should be permitted for 
his own selfish purpose to use the picture or the name 
of another for advertising purposes without his consent. 
In such event no embarrassment would result to the gen• 
eral body of the law, for the rule would be applicable 
only to cases provided for by the statute. The courts, 
however, being without authority to legislate, are 
required to decide caaea upon principle, and so are 
necessarily embarrassed by precedents created by an 
extreme, and tgerefore unjustifiable, application of an 
old principle. 
The 1903 statute did exactly this. It provided that 
no one should use the name, portrait or picture of any 
' living person without his prior written consent for "adver-
tising purposes" .. bT "for the purposes of trade."7 
The statute also eliminated the fear of Judge Parker 
that the doctrine of privacy, once recognized, would be 
'i Ssmi th and Proseer, "Cases on 
tl Published by Foundation Preas, Inc,, 
671 N.Y. $39 
Torts,", Book$, p.l638, 
Brooklyn, 1952. 
,, 
d 
I 
7New York Civil Rights Law, Sections 50, 51. 
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unlimited. Only those cases provided for by the statute 
could be given relief on an invasion of privacy. The law, 
! as entered in 1903, granted protection under these condi-
" i' tiona: 
Section 50: A parson, firm or corporation that uses 
for advertising purposes, or for purposes of trade, the 
nama, portrait or picture or any living person without 
having first obtained the written consent of such person, 
or if a minor, of his or her parent or guardian, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor, 
Section Slt Any parson whose name, portrait or pic-
ture is used within this state for advertising purposes 
or for the purposes of trade without the written consent 
firat obtained as above provided may maintain an equi-
table action in the aupreme court of this state against 
the person, firm, or corporation so using his name, por-
trait or picture to prevent and restrain the use thereof; 
and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries 
sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant 
shall have knowingly used such parson's name, portrait 
or picture in such manner as is forbidden or declared 
to be unlawful, by the last section, the jury in its 
discretion, may award exemplary damages. But nothing 
contained in this set shall be so construed as to pre-
vent any person, firm, or corporation practicin~ the 
profession of photography, from exhibiting in or about 
his or ita aatabliahmenta, unless the same is continued 
by such person, firm or corporat:l.on after written notice 
objectifig thereto has been given by the person por-
trayed, 
The vast number of cases in every jurisdiction involv-
:1 ing the invasion of privacy for purposes of trade or adver-
tieing would indicate that this statute provides protection 
for one of the moat flagrant and common invasions of privacy. 
The class of cases is wall defined here; they are limited to 
the use of names or likenesses and are further restricted to 
:·-:--·...,-_-_- --=-"~-'"'" ::·· ----·--·· 
29 
ii uses involving a cOIIIlllercial approbation. However, this 
'I ,~ statute is not as comprehensive, in some respects, as is the 
,! ,, 
,, 
doctrine of privacy applied in some jurisdictions. 
For example, the unauthorized use of a person's name 
on a petition or in connection with some other political or 
governmental matter, the publication of the most intimate 
details of an individual's private life, or various forma of 
eavesdropping, or the posting of a debtor by a creditor not 
being for purposes of advertising or trade, would apparently 
not come within the inhibition of the statute. 
Did this then mean that the communications media in 
the state of New York had free sledding in and out of the 
private lives of individuals, commenting and reporting upon 
them as long as use for purposes of advertising or trade was 
avoided? Concerning relief on a complaint of invasion of 
privacy, the answer is objectively "yes." However, the media 
are not as unlimited in their "sledding" as a strict analysis 
of the statutory regulation on relief for invasion of privacy 
might lead one to believe. It is the interpretation of the 
courts as to what constitutes a "commercial approbation" as 
well as what exactly is "unauthorised use" that imposes a 
regulation on the media. The regulation aims at providing 
protection for the individual against the insatiable curios-
ii ity of communications media, 
:r 
'i In 1933 a New York court gave the opinion that: 
.i 
i ~ 
:: 
! 
- ;;._; 
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Except to the limited extent provided by statute ••• 
there is no right of privacy •••• Written words, the 
effect of which is to invade privacy and to bring 
undesired notoriety are without remedy, unless they 
also appreciably affect reputation. This is the domain, 
not of positive law, but of obedience to the unenforce-
able. From such harm one is protected only by the code 
of common decency.9 
However, statutory law overlaps the code of common 
decency and affords protection for one's privacy while it 
also grants relief for the violation of the individual's 
sole right to his name and picture. In essense, as long as 
there is a commercial approbation involved, thera is protec-
tion of tho person's privacy. 
;:.:-. 
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II , THJ JJiFFEC T OF THB STATUTE 
01~ N.&.'WS COVERAGE 
Thera is one instance in which the statute does not 
apply, but here again it is a matter for the court to decide. 
This is the presentation of news to the public, even with 
the approbation of one's nams or portrait. 
Publication of name or likeness connected with news 
does not give such a person a right of action,lO 
It is not the purpose of the New York statute to stop 
the dissemination of news as a business in itself or as 
an adjunct to the sale of advertialng,ll 
Aa observed in the judge's comments in Martin v. 
Metropolitan Fiction Incorporated, the legitimate use of 
names and pictures in legitimate enterpriss depends upon~ 
purpose as it is viewed in connection with the reaction of 
' the public rather than in connection vti th the person using 
the names or p1ctures.l2 
This theory is illustrated in the now classic case 
employing the New York Civil Rights Statute--Sidle v. F. [. 
'i Publishing Corpora t1 on.l.3 
·i 
i: 
' 
In this ease the court designated any publication, 
which imparts truthful news or other factual information to 
the public, out of the range of protection afforded by the 
!1 New York statute, 
i' t! 
10Ibid,, 
lJ113 F. 
48 11Ib1d. 12248 N,Y,S, 359 (1931) 
2d 806 (1940) 
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William Sidia waa a one-time child prodigy whoae 
:1 graduation from Harvard at the age of 16 was eonaidered by 
!I 
~~ the public, following the aeeounta in the newspaper of hie 
i! 
d 
!1 
:i 
accompliahmenta, indicative of a great and productive 
tuture. After his graduation, which was surrounded by con-
aiderabls public attention, the young genius was seldom 
heard of except in occasional newspaper commenta,l4 
The!!! Yorker magazine, which says its pages are 
"not for your aunt in Dubuque" carries, on the contrary, 
:l 
,, quite sober and often enlightening biographical sketches of 
,, people of publlll intereat, current and past. These sketchea 
appeared under the title "Where Are They Now?" In 1934, the 
Auguat issue of the !!! Yorker published an article on Sidia 
subtitled "April Fool." In it the author recalled the bril-
liant achievements of young Sidis, such as hie lectures at 
age 11 on the subject of tour-dimensional bodies. The 
writer described the subsequent withdrawal of the young man 
into a life as an insignificant clerk who would not need to 
use any unusual mathematical talents. The writer then noted 
Sidle' enthusiasm tor collecting streetcar transfers, and 
referred to his genius of having "flowered" in the form of a 
great proficiency at an adding mach1ne. 1S 
The article related parts of an interview with S1d1a 
l4Ibid., 808 
' ' 
" 
:: 
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il i; in his lodgings--"• hall bedro011 of Boston's shabby South 
: ~ 
a i: End." The conclusion told of his messy and disorderly room, 
;: hia "curious laugh," and other personal habi tel. The sub-
li 
:j title was explained by the closing sentence, quoting Sidis 
' !i ~~ as saying "with a grin" that it was strange, "but you know, 
:; 
Ji I was born on April Fool 1 a Day." 
i 
il Sidis sued the publisher for an invasion of his pri-
vacy as recognized in California, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, 
I! and JUssouri, and for infringement of the rights afforded 
,, 
" :: 
!i 
" .,
him under the Rew York statute. 
The court in reviewing the case stated that: 
It is not contended that any of the matter printed is 
tmtrue. Nor is the manner of the author unfriendly; 
Sidis today is described as having "a certain childlike 
charm." But the article is merciless in its dissection 
of intimate details of its subject's personal life, and 
this in company with elaborate accounts of Sidis's 
passion for privacy and the pitiable lengths to which he 
bas gone in order to avoid public scrutiny. The work 
possesses great reader interest, for it is both amusing 
and instructive; but it may be fairly described as a 
ruthless exposure of a once public character, who has 
since sought and bas now been deprived of the seclusion 
of private life.l6 
I L 
r: 
,, 
Firat of all, there was the question of whether the 1i 
:; 
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court would recognize the decisions of the five other juris• 
dictions granting relief on an invasion of privacy referred 
to in the complaint. The court, in accordance with the 
precedent set in the Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box ~-
I I 
F 
;i 
• 
!i 
.. ·"'*--"'' II 
il 
li 
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I' !I ~· would not recognize an individual' a right to be let 
il 
!I alone as a aeparate cause for action. The court said that 
il II 
'I Sidia was, becauae of his paat, an "indefinable public 
'I l! ii character" and therefore subject to at least limited seru-
'1 
!: tiny. It was held that since the article in the R!! Yorker 
;I 
, sketched the life of an unusual personal! ty and possessed 
,I 
,! 
: ~ 
considerable popular news interest--there could be no inva-
sion of privecy,l7 
The second charge, that the right granted hhu under 
the New York Civil Rights Statute had been infringed upon, 
was also d!smisaed by the court. 
In giving his opinion, Judge Clark pointed out that 
11 the atatute forbids publication of a person's name or pic-
:: 
., ture only when either 1e employed "for advertising purposes" 
or for "purposes of trade." His evaluation of the esse at 
hand did not include any of theBe restrictionl. 
I ,, 
In this context (underlining not in original) it is 
clear that "for purpoaes of trade" does not contemplate 
the publication of a newspaper, magazine or book which 
imparts trutgtul news or other factual information to 
the publte.l 
The Judge indicated that even though a publisher 
:: sells a commodity and expects a prof! t from 1 t, he is not 
affected by the statute as long as he confines himself to 
the "unembrc!dered" d!saemination of facts. 
l7ng. 
' ,, 
:i 
·r 
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The judge maintained that his decision was not 
': intended to set a precedent making truth a defense under the 
,: statute. If the publication was itself an article of com-
:: 
merce, such as a book or magazine, not intended to advertise 
some other product, it could claim the immunity outlined in 
the statute. But if the purpoae of the publication was to 
promote or stimulate trade in some other article or service, 
:, and it used without author! ty the name or picture of an 
individual, it might be actionable under the statute, 
, although it was entirely true and disclosed nothing but 
:! 
:1 facts • 
. : 
The Sidle case is significant in that it illustrates 
how the courts will ignore approbation or fail to find if an 
element of "public interest" can be attached to the article 
in question. The ease established that (1) a person may 
become a public figure against his will, (2) the test of 
permissible invasions of a public figure's privacy is "the 
community's notions of decency," (3) public interest limits 
the liability, and <4> when information is offered liability 
is extinguished. 
In a ease entering the courts the same year as the 
Sidis case, the New York jurisdiction again took a stand 
differentiating between a publication for wpurposes of 
trade" which would be actionable under the statute, and one 
for information on current events or of immediate public 
ii 
36 
li interest, which would not be actionable under the statute. 
Lahiri v. Daily M1rrorl9 the court said: II !! ,, 
" il 
I 
ln 
Newspapers publish articl~a which are neither 
strictly news articles nor strictly pictorial in char-
acter. They are not the responses to an event of 
peculiarly immediate interest, but though baaed on 
fact, are used to satiety an ever-presf!nt; educational 
need,20 
Here is seen a further eXpansion or the interpret&-
' tion given the statute protecting one's right of privacy--
the fulfillment of the public educational need dominating 
;! 
' the public need for privacy, In the Lahiri case, the courts 
:: 
!l decided that an article using a man's name and picture in 
" the description of mysticism aurrounding the famous Indian 
~ rope trick, did not entitle the man to relief under the New 
York statute since the article was not intended for trade 
" but for education. 
! 
The article, which appeared in the magazine section 
" of the paper and entitled "I Saw the Famous Rope Trick (But d 
q 
!l It Really Didn 1 t Happen)" attempted to show that the trick 
!i depended upon the creation of an illusion which in turn 
connected with oriental mysticism, The author included i ~ 
with the story a theatrical picture or the plaintiff, a 
il 
was 
;! 
,, well-known Hindu musician, playing a JIIUsical instrument in 
: accompaniment to an Iridian girl dancing, 
ij 
The caption under 
': the picture suggea ted that something of the occult ,, 
li i! 
I) 
" i· l9295 N.Y.S, 382 (1937) 20Ib1d,, 384 
!l 
ii 
I' 
" 
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philosophy which dominates the Far East was evidenced even 
in the gestures and postures of dancers like those !n the 
picture. In holding that the article was not for purposes 
of tr!lde or adv!lrt~.f'li.ng, the court said: 
The instant article ie :-~ct one o.f f:tctton. It is 
clearly one concerning a matter having legitimate news 
interest. A British society had offered a suhetantlal 
prize to anyone able to perform the famous rope trick. 
The author of the article showed how the tr1.ck was 
allege~ly performed in India and the possibility of the 
society being called upon to pay the prize. Tho use of 
professional actors to pose for some of the pictures 
illustrating the article did not change its character 
from one ~1' news or• general in1'orma tion to one of 
tiction,2 
The court reasoned further that this particular arti-
cle fell into the class of those satisfying "the aver-
prt!leant educational need." Such articles, it was stated, 
include, among others, travel stories, stories of d1.ste.nt 
placee, tales of historic persona~es and events, the repro-
duction of items or past news, and surveys of social condi-
tionn. In the case of the use of Lah1.r1 1 "' picture, 1 t was 
purely for purposes of illustrating an educst:tonal and 
:: informative article and not for any purposes of trade or 
,, 
!'advertising, according to the decision of the court.22 
'l 
By designating a newspap~r, magazine, book, or other 
printed media as "educational" or of "public interest" and 
therefore outside the protection of the New York statute, 
,, _______ _ 
21Ibid,, 386 22Ibid. 
\\ 
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1: the jurisdiction of New York leaves open a vast field for 
invasion of the individual's right to be let alone. The 
newspaper, or medium in question, undoubtedly makes profit 
:· as a result or many such articles--yet, because the public 
' 
i needs to be educated, or made aware of current events, the 
courts refuse recognition or any approbation in such 
' i' 
1
i instances • 
This seems fair and just, for if publication alone 
were deemed by the courts to conatitute a purpose for trade, 
', the media would not be able to report any daily news events, 
q 
' or even a vital statistics list without risking a charge of 
:: ,, 
invasion of an individual's privacy. 
The variant which determines what is newsworthy or of 
public interest is no more strictly defined under the statu-
tory law of New York than under the common law in any other 
states. What the existence of a statute does is to provide 
definite relief by injunction and special damages when the 
court decides a violstion of the statute has occurred. 
Under the common law, though a case may be definitely 
decided as a violation of one's privacy, relief is often 
unsatisfactory because of lack or precedent. 
ri In Binns v. Vitagraph Company of America, 23 the court 
1: 
illustrated in ita decision that there is a limit to the 
23 132 N.Y.S. 237 
39 
permissible dramatization of currant events in newsreels. 
When this limit is overstepped, relief is granted under the 
civil rights statute, 
A movie was made by the defendant about a shipwreck--
the story was based on actual occurrence, but reconstructed 
" ;, in the movie, The movie included the acts of the plaintiff 
;r 
1: who was a wireless operator on the ship, and whose efforts 
!i 
I 
1
: at sending meaaages resulted in saving lives of many paasen-
gars. The plaintiff was played by an actor who appeared six 
times in the movie. In holding the violation actionable the 
'' court said: 
The defendant used the plaintiff's alleged picture to 
amuse those who paid to be entertained. If the use of 
plaintiff's name and picture as shown in this case is 
not within the terms of the statute, then the picture of 
any individual can be similarly made and exhibited for 
the purposes of showing his peculiarities as of dress, 
walk, and his personal fads, eccentricities, amusements, 
and even his private lire. By such pictures an audience 
would be amused and the maker of the films and the 
exhibitors enriched. The grea tar the ex.aggera tion in 
euch a eeriee of pictures so long as they were not 
libelous, the greater4wouid be the profit of the picture maker and exhlbitor.2 
In ueing the term "alleged picture," the judge was 
:; referring to the picture of the plaintiff as it appeared on 
the screen. It was actually the likeness of a professional 
actor posing as the plaintiff for purposes of dramatization. 
·1 Thus in the courts 1 t must be referred to as an "alleged" 
,, picture. ,, 
I! 
:1 
" ii 24Ib1d., 239 
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The decision for the plaintiff was based on the fact 
that his name and picture were used as a matter of business 
and profit and therefore contrary to the statute. It was 
pointed out that the movie did not constitute true pictures 
of a current event but was mainly a product of the imagina-
tion "based largely upon such information as could readily 
be obtained. n2$ 
In a comparison of the Binns ease just cited, and th,e 
"boy genius" Sid is case previously discussed, it would be 
helpful to the reporter if a definite conclusion could be 
drawn as a result of the two differing decisions handed 
down. In the Sidis case there was the decision denying an 
ri 1 invasion of privacy on the grounds that the subject was 
; newa-worthy and of current interest, In the Binns case, a 
violation of privacy was recognized since a commercial 
!' approbation of face and name was found, Yet, the reasoning 
" 
1
' of the courts in giving their decisions does little to indi-
cate to the communicator exactly what did in one case con-
i! 
, stitute a violation of privacy and what in the other did !12!• 
Both Sidis and Binns were public characters of gen-
1: 
'' eral and current intereat--Sidis because of his past life, 
1 Binns because of a major news event of the day. It could 
:i 
i! almost be said that 1 f anything, Binns, because of the 
i! 
!i 
li 
!, 'r 
-"'1!"=-
i ~ 
" ·'"'trC ........ , .. "' -·---·-----· ~---·- --·· 
,, 
" 
., 
,, 
II importance of and more wide spread intareat in a major 
II 
·l 
" tragedy such as the ll!nking of a liner, could more just!-
fiably have been called a public figure than Sidis, The 
latter's fame was a part of the past wh1ch might have 
remained unnoticed except tor the magazine article. Yet, 
1
,
1 Sidis was not granted relief for invasion of his privacy 
1· since the court deemed commentary on him permissible because 
o.t his position sa a public figure, whereas Binns was 
granted an injunction and special damages for the invasion 
or his privacy for "purposes of trade"--regardless of the 
'' tact that he, too, was a public .figure. 
' ,, 
The judge in the B:l.nns case spoke of pointing up 
H 
'' one's peculiarities or dress, walk and personal eccentric-
itiea, amusements and even private life as most certainly 
being protected by the New York statute, Yet, the article 
concerning Sidis did exactly that. It pointed to his 
streetcar ticket collecting as a rather peculiar manifesta-
tion of genius; it emphasized the untidiness of his living 
'' quarters and person; it referred to his vacuous grin and 
p desire to be let alone in his "shabby quarters." Here is a 
i\ 
:j perfect illustration of the actions cited by the judge in 
: the Binns case as being undeniable invasions of a person's 
,, right of privacy, Yet, for Sidla, that right was denied. 
'! 
,; Why? What DIS kes the distinction between these two il 
iJ 
1! cases involving a person of public interest and fame? The ,. 
!I 
1 !, 
!i 
I! !I 
' 
most significant difference seems to lie in the presentation 
d of "truthful, unembroidered facts"--not about anyone, but !I 
li concerning a person of public interest,26 These factors--
~ i 
i! 
,i truth and a public figure--are the protecting instruments of 
the communications media under the New York statute, 
The magazine, which presented a factual report on 
Sidis as a one-time public figure, was free from any com-
H plaints of oo!ll!llercial approbation of the subject's name or 
picture. The moving picture company dramatizing the actual 
event of the shipwreck was not free from the statute's limi-
' tation since purposes of trade and advertising were found in 
ji 
! the entertainment factor of the picture. The plaintiff in 
:! 
this ease was fictionalized and dramatized enough to make 
:; 
I 
' him more than a figure of public interest; he became a figure i! 
I' of entertainment and thus of colll!llercial value. 
F 
The exception to the rule must never be overlooked, 
however. For although the theory that an "unembroidered" 
presentation of facts provides a safeguard for media to keep 
!.· from violating the privacy statute--the mot! ve in presenting 
these facts can be questioned, In the Binns case, the 
motive (entertainment) resulted in judgment against the 
medium. In another case which preceded the E1nns case--
Humhton v. Universal FHm Manufacturing Company27 --rel1er 
264 Harvard ~ Review 192, Warren and Brandeis 
commenting on what constitutes "news." 
=¥====2=7_278 N,Y,S. 7S2 (1919) 
-~-~l'o' ... ···-·· 
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!, 
" was denied the plaintiff who claimed that his right of pri-
li 
!! li vacy had begn violated in a motion picture of news events in 
:: 
ii 
It which his na:ne and picture appeared, The court said: 
It matters not what may be the motive in the pub-
lishing of these films, whether instructive or whether 
to satisfy the morbid curiosity any ~ore than it 
matters what may be the motive ln the publishing of 
actual news items in a newspaper,28 
It can be assumed, therefore, that instead of the 
"motive of the publ1cati•m it is the result that determines I! 
i> i! if there is a violation under the privacy statute. If the 
' 1
; publiMtion in any way results in a commercial use of an 
ii individual's name or picture, a violation of privacy can be 
1'! 
" I' 
li 
" i! !· 
" 
" 
charged, 
The courts decided that "tame" is not a commodity of 
commercial value in the Downes v. Culbertson casa. 29 With-
,, out discussion the court held that the use of the phrase if 
,-
1i "Culbertson system" in Downs 1 s publication was not unau th-
' ;i 
or1zed. The general widespread and popular use of the term 
which was the result of the fame and acclaim glven a bridge 
[, game developed by Mr. Culbertson excluded the plaintiff from 
li relief. JO 
r 
Although the New York eourts themselves described as 
"questionable and indefinable" the status of a "public 
:i ----------------
" li 
-1 p 
ll 
28Ib1d., 753 
3°Ibid,, 2.54 
29275 N.Y.S. 253 
li ,, 
:; 
--- ,,·oc=jl-c-,-,, c coc~.c. oc. _ _ _ 
[! 
I! ll figure" or "an individual in the public eye 11 31 they con-
44 
I• 
!i dstently deny a right of privacy under the New York statute 
q 
r: to anyone attaining this position. As indicated by the 
!\ ,,
1: cases investigated, when an individuaJ appears, voluntarily 
ll or not, in a news situation, or becomes a persnn of public 
interest, he may not claim approbation of his na~e or pic-
ii ture for purposes of trade--and thus, he is not anti tled to 
redress for an invasion of his privacy within the Hew York 
jurisprudence. 
:: 
i! 
I' !! 
!'--------.. 
:: 
(1940) 3lSidis v. ~ Publishing Corporation, 113 F. 2d 8o6 Comment by Circuit Judge Clark 
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III. PROTECTION FOB AN ASSUMED NAME 
UNDER THE STATUTE 
The courts of New York have ahown amazing consistency 
" in applying the privacy atatute to the uae of aasumed or 
' 
fictitioua names. The predominate decision is that the 
,; atatute does not relate to atage or other fictitious or 
fi ;: ii assumed names. 
I! 
In Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Company,32 the 
' !i 
, plaintiff tried to recover tor the use of her stage name, 
Aunt Jemima, in radio advertising. The court said: 
Having in mind the evident purpoae of the atatute, 
its application to a public or atage name, as well as a 
private one, seems inevitable •••• If the atage name has 
come to be closely and widely identified with the person 
who bears it, the need for protection against unauth-
orised advertiaing will be aa urgent as in the case of a 
private name, if anything the need will be more urgent. 
The public character of a name may mean the surrender of 
a certain degree of privacy and may effect the extent 
and limit of the protection afforded. But the abuse of 
such a name by an advertiser cannot be justified, aqo it 
is against such abuse that the statute is directed.J3 
It was held, however, that the statute did not apply 
in this case against the Log Cabin Products Company who had 
previously adopted and registered the name "Aunt Jemima" as 
a trademark. 
Nor was the statute held to apply when a person had 
li not legally changed her name or had taken the assumed name 
il 
!! 
:I 
3289 F.{d) 891 (1937) 33Ibid., 893 
i 
H-
"' 
'• il li as her common law name, In Davia v. ~ Radio P1ctures,34 
li Claire H, Davis charged that her stags name "Countess Casan-
i: li dra" had been used by the motion picture firm in a movie for 
,, 
" 
the purposes of trade. The movie's "Countess Caaandra" was 
presented as a fortune teller, cheat, and swindler, and Miss 
Davis, who had achieved a wide reputation under that nama as 
an author and lecturer, alleged that great professional dam-
age was done to her. 
Tha court pointed out that the name "Casandra" origi-
:i nally denoted a mythological p~ophetesa, and stated that the 
I 
1 
movie company had as much right to usa that nama in depicting 
the character 1n question as had Miss Davia to assume the 
nama in connection w1 th her profess1on,3S 
An assumed nama for conducting business is distinct 
from the assumed or fictitious stage nama. However, the New 
York courts are consistent 1n decisions refusing relief to a 
:: person who has assumed, or in any way associated his name 
:: with a budnesa. The courts have held that a name assUJned 
for business purposes only and granted exclusively to a cor• 
poration cannot be protected under the atatute.36 Also, the 
:: privacy statute does not extend to co-partnerships and does 
!I 
'! not protect partnership names. 37 
p 
,, 
!I 
'· !! 
:, 
!i 
i ~ 
;i 
' ,, 
:: 
H ,, 
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I 
i' 
I 
,I 
li 
3416 F. Supp 19.$ (1936, D.C.) )$Ibid., 197 
36Jaccard v. ~· Maey ~ Company, 126 N.Y.s. (2d) 829 
37Roaenwaaer v. Ogolia, 1$8 N.Y.S • .$6 (1916) 
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IV. PUBLISHING OF FICTION AllD NON-FICTION 
UNDtm THE STATUTE 
In the presentation of news events, a~ in the cases 
of Sidis and Binns, the protection afforded individual pri-
vacy under the statute was basad largely in the presentation 
of the events. In the one case, because the media "fiction-
:, ali zed" the event, it waa found in violation of the privacy 
i, statute, whereas, a non-fictionalized profile was found not 
:1 to be in any such violation. 
There is an entire field of publishing which is 
, brought into the courts from time to time which involves 
" ::fiction and non-fiction. However, this field deals in the j: 
\ ~ reporting of events which are not necessarily news events or 
,of current interest--but are more for the literary enjoyment 
of the public. 
ii 
I 
! 
Whereas at common law a person may charge that his 
privacy has been invaded simply by the intrusion of the nov-
elist or article writer into the individual's private life, 
under the New York statute a use for purposes of trade or 
I! advertising must always b!il proven. 38 
,, To date, relief under the statute to persons alleging 
i~ a commercial approbation ef namt~ or picture in fiction has 
i: not been gran ted. 39 
I' 
;i 
' 
• 
" 
c~iL • · o~.o;c, ~· ... --· ,_, 
li 
I I 
li 
I 1, 
48 
To outlaw the use of "local color" in writing was not 
the purpose of the statute according to the court in Damron 
v, Doubleday.40 In this ease Wayne Damron brought action [! il 
i' 1 ( , under the statute charging that the use of his name which 
,, 
" li appeared only once) in the novel "Showboat" was for purposes 
,, 
!! 
of trade, :: The court, in refusing an action said that the 
ii 
I! statute was not passed for the purposel! of interfering w1 th 
ii 
;1 the eiroula tion of newspapers or the pub 11M tion o.r books. 
ij 
!1 'l'he pla!nti.ff in this cue could not establish sufficient 
ii 
!! identification with tha "little Wayne Damron" of tl:ie story 
:: to prove any c0111merelal use of his own name. 
Lack of identification was again the determining tao-
:i 
11 tor in denying relief under the ata tute to a person charging 
use of his name and work of 
ii fiction. 
II 
In Swaker 
characterization of hi~ in a 
v. Wright41 the court said: 
! 
!i ,, 
,. 
,, 
!! 
d ,, 
:: 
i: 
I! 
'· !i ,, 
' ., 
il 
" !f 
1! 
,I ,, 
!I 
Mere use of plaintiff's Christian name and surname 
with his middle initial omitted, without eny other 
identifying feature, cannot b,_held a sufficient basis 
for relief under the statute.~ 
In this case, the plaintiff, Frank Swaker, who was a 
lawyer and had once acted as assistant to the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States, sought relief under the privacy 
statute for the appearance of the name "Frank Swaker" in a 
40231 B.Y.S. 444 (1928) 
41277 N.Y.S, 296 (1938) 
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·I 
1 aeries of books. In the bnoks, Swaker was in the cast of 
I characters as an assistant to a district attorney. 
" 
The court held that apart from the name, there was 
not a single parallel between the plaintiff and the charac-
I! ter portrayed by the author. 
,, 
T"ne judge s tat ed:~ 
:: 
'rhe statute was enacted to protect the privacy of 
persons, not to redress imagined wrongs or to subject 
authors and publishers to hazards against which it is 
well nigh impossible to guard.~3 
Here, in the very words of the judge is a misleading 
definition of the privacy statute. He says the law was 
passed to "protect~ privacy of peraona"--but actually this 
is only halt true. The statute protects the privacy of a 
i• i! person only when there has been an invasion "tor purposes of 
trade or advertiaing." This is the significant factor in 
, the privacy statute. This "tor purposes of trade or adver-
,. 
" tiaing" is the feature of the !lew York statute which makes 
i ~ 
1,\ the state unique ill its stand on privacy among all other 
II 
'i jurisdictions. 
,, 
In the case of non-fiction, the New York statuta has 
:, seldom given protection to individuals seeking restraints 
!! 
1
1 for the use of name or picture in biographical or feature-
-: type articles. 
In Jeffries v. !!! ~Evening Publishing Company,44 
pugilist was not entitled to an injunct:ton against a news-i: II a 
" 1! 
~--------
:: 4Jib1d., 299 44124 N.Y.s. 780 (1910) 
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50 
paper to prohibit the use of his picture to illustrate his 
biography. In this case, the plaintiff charged that his 
picture and life history were of considerable commercial 
value since he had written an autobiography of public inter-
est and great financial value. He attempted to bring the 
ease under the statute by charging that his picture gave the 
newspaper increased circulation and thereby, inereaaed value 
aa an advertising medium. In deciding the case the court 
pointed out : 
This stretches the language of the statute ad absur-
dum •••• In my opinion a picture is not uaed for adver-
tising purpoaea within its meaning unless the picture is 
part of an advertisement, while "trade" refers to com-
merce,gr traffic, not to the diasemination of informa-
tion.~.~-> 
Here ia given still another definition of what the 
, privacy statute protects. 'l'he judge in this case offered 
li 
the opinion that unless the picture (or name) appeared in an 
actual advertisement, it was not being used to advertise, 
and that trade, under the statute, must be a part of com-
merce to infer violation. 
It would seem, from a study of the various interpre-
tations given the privacy statute by presiding judges, that 
no common agreement in decision exista. Yet, despite the 
I diverse reuoning, the resulting decisions have been predom-
,, 
i inately concurring in the field of fiction and non-fiction. 
:I 
il 
!i 
; ~
I' 
i! 
45Ibid., 782 
!I 
·~··if . -
il .51 ,, 
I' 
:I i! It will be interesting to aee the outcome of the caae 
II just entered in the New York court. to see lf there is still 
II 
iJ another definition given the statute by the presiding judge. 
As reported in Time magazine, Bonnie Golightly is suing 
' Truman Capote, the author of the 19$9 best seller Breakfast 
i! !.! Tiffanz'•··• fictional novel about a girl named Polly 
Golightly who maintains a whirlwind existence in Manhattan's 
theater crowd.46 Bonnie Golightly charges that the novel's 
"Polly" is a characterization of her own life and personal-
., 
·: 
:! ity and maintains that under the Hew York statute she 1s 
:: anti tled to special damages for the uae of her name and l!fe 
,, 
:I 
'' history for purposes of trade. She is also suing on a sepa· 
ii rate count of libel. 
:! 
'I ,, 
!I Author Capote points out that there are many more 
'' differences between his fictional character and Bonnie 
:l ,, 
Golightly than there are aimilaritiea. He further defends 
himself by stating that he in no way could have been invad-
ing any one individual's privacy since his character was a 
portrait of several girls he had known in Manhattan "none of 
which are about to sue me.n47 
The case, if it goes to trial at all, will not enter 
the courts until late 19$9. However, it will be a test of 
46Time, Vol. LXXIII, (January, 19$9) 
47Ibid. 
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il 
\j the theory held by the judge in the Swaker case that the New 
li 
H 
" 
York statute might often be called upon to defend "imagined 
wrongs" or to predestine authors and publishers "to hazards 
against which it is well nigh impossible to guard.n48 
46277 N.Y.S. 296 (also cited 1n this chapter, p. 49) 
" 
,, 
...jb_-
I 
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V. EFFECT OF THE S 'l'A TUTE ON THE: 
PRODUCTION OF MOTION PICTURES 
The privacy statute protects only an 1ndivid.ual Wh08e 
name or picture has been used for pecuniary gains and not 
for damage to personal feelings. Therefore, suits brought 
by a professional actor or actress seldom enter the courts, 
since an actor's purpose in appearing in the films is pre-
cisely tor pecuniary· benefit. However, documentary films, 
newsreels, and non-dramatic films in general are more sus-
oeptible to violation of the privacy statute. In such films, 
the photographer often turns his camera to subjects who are 
not aware of their momentary transformation into "actors." 
These people, the "impromptu actors," are the ones whose 
privacy the communicator must take care not to unlawfully 
invade. 
When the appearance of a person or his name is only 
! "incidental" in the scene and is not the actual subject of 
the picture, or does not add any particular commercial value 
to the film the New York courts have not granted relief.49 
In the ease of Merle v. Sociological Research f1lm 
Corporation,50 such an incidental use of a man's name in a 
picture was held insufficient grounds for an invaAion of 
privacy complaint. The plaintiff• R. E. Merle. owned a 
so 8 152 N.Y.S. 29 
tl 
i! 
II ~ 
., 
" 'I 11 building with hls own name and the nama of his business on 
' 1 the front of it. In a moving picture produced by th"' 
I[ 
:'i 
' 
Research Corporation entitled "The Inside of the White Slave 
Traffic" the building appeared in one of the scenes, with 
the business' name visible. The judge, in denying an inva-
sion of privacy said; 
The use of the plaintiff's name in this case is not 
for the purposes of obtaining trade or advertising; 
apparently, it merely appears in the picture because it 
was placed on a building which was part of the picture. 
Certainly where a man places his name on the outside of 
a building he cannot claim that a person who would 
otherwise have a right to photograph it would be pre-
cluded from using that picture because the sign also 
appears on the picture. To constitute a violation of 
the Civil Rights Law, I think it must appear that the 
use of the plaintiff's picture or name is itself for 
the purpose of trade and not merely an incidental part 
ot a photograph of an actual building which cannot be 
presumed to add to the value of the photograph for trade 
or advertising. Even a use in a particular instance 
causir~ acute annoyance cannot give rise to an action 
under the statute unl~ts it fairly falls within the 
terms of the statute.5l 
Here ia a parallel to the "public figure," as defined 
by the judge, only this is a "public building" which, Ly its 
nature, is subject to public scrutiny and observance accord-
ing to the presiding judge. Because this building, together 
with the name on the front, was in the public eye, it could 
not all of a sudden be considered a "private" possession 
which only tha owner would be entitled to view, 
Sllbid., 831 
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This case also pointed out the importance of "inci-
dental" use as not adding commercial value to the picture. 
The judge noted that even if such a building were shown in a 
1! "particular instance" the violation alleged would have to be 
strictly within the terms of the statute--or, more precisely, 
would have to be definitely for purposes of trade or adver-
tising. 
In the field of newsreels, the theory which applies 
to any type of news communication is the usual rule. If a 
person is of current intereat, or a public figure, he is 
subject to the camera of the newsreel photographer. How-
ever, as in the Binns ease, cited previously, there are 
exceptions.52 The wireless operator on the wrecked ship who 
was a public figure was still entitled to relief because of 
the particular portrayal of him in the movie. Warren and 
Brandeis suggested that this type of contrad:l.ction in prece-
dent might be necessary at times: 
Any rule of liability adopted must have 1n it an 
elasticity which shall take account of the varying 
circumstances of each case,--a necessity which unfor-
tunately renders such a doctrine not only more diffi-
cult of application, but also to a certain extent 
uncertain5in its operation and easily rendered abortive. J 
The more consistent precedent has not been in 
52cr. page 56 of this chapter 
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ii agreement with the decision in the Binns caae, When a per-
.: son appears in a motion picture as part of an event or cir-
" cumstance of public interest he cannot claim damages under 
the privacy statute. This was emphasized in the case of 
Sweenek v. Pathe Newa,$4 
Miss Sweenek appeared in a newsreel showing a group 
of ove1•-weight women exercising w1 th various types of appa-
ratus in a gymnasium. She sued on grounds that her picture 
had been used for trade, The court dismissed the case 
stating: 
Pictures of a group of corpulent women attempting to 
reduce with the aid of some rather unique and novel 
apparatus do not cross the borderline, at least so long 
as a large portion of the female sex continuearita 
present concern about any increased poundage.~~ 
The "borderline" referred to here is the one which 
separates the invasion of privacy as recognized in some 
states at common law where personal feelings are damaged, 
and the invasion which New York recognizes involving only 
commercial approbation. The tact that weight-reducing was 
: coneidered a problem of general public interest was deemed 
by the judge to qualify the picture newsworthy and there-
fore not entitled to the statute's protection. 
The judge also noted: 
The amusing comments which accompanied the pictures 
did not detract from their news value. If they made the 
$416 F. Supp 746 (1936 D.C.) 
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plaintiff appear ridiculous and exceeded the privilege 
of fair comment, then her action is for slander or 
libel, but not under the civil rights law of New York.56 
This comment further points up the value to the com• 
municator of knowing whether his subject is newsworthy and 
therefore beyond the protective limits of the New York stat-
ute. i~e judge also emphasized here th&t New York does not 
confuse damage done by libel or slander with an invasion of 
, privacy, as is sometimes the case at common law. 
Television, which reflects closely the production 
problems of the motion picture industry, has also tasted the 
legal problems. Although the courts have stated that tele-
vision would have the same rights as other media in news and 
information programs, one court suggested that television 
'I' d may well be the moot susceptible to invading the individual's 
' 
right to be let alone. For in the impromptu production 
which characterizes much of television programing, there is 
the constant opportunity to pick out individual faces and 
flash them upon the screen. Thia, according to the New York 
courts in Gautier v. Pro Football Incorporated,57 would moat 
definitely constitute a violation of the privacy statute. 
In this caae an animal trainer, parforming at half-
time at a nationally televised fo~tball game, claimed inva~ 
sion of privacy when his picture was put on the viewer's 
screen. 
57106 N.Y.S. 2553 19$1 
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1~e lower court awarded damages; the Court of Appeals 
,i 
1
' reversed the decision, however. 
ii. 
It was held that there was 
i' 
i) 
ii 
!I 
" 
" 
"no exploitation of the ani.mal trainer's name or picture in 
the commercial announcement or in direct connection with the 
product of the telecaster's sponaor ... 58 
The court noted the ridiculousness of this suit in 
claiming invasion of the right to be let alone, when the 
performance was for pay before 35,000 spectators. However, 
the court predicted the caution necessary for the television 
industry to take in order to avoid violation of the privacy 
eta tute: 
One attending a public event may expect to be tele-
vised in the status in which he attends. If a mere 
spectator, he may be taken as part of the general 
audience, but may not ~ picked ~ of ~ crowd alone 
and thrust upol the screen unduly featured for public 
view. (Underl ning not in orlginai)59 ---
As any other media, television can use the name or 
picture of an individual in connection with an item of news 
without such use being considered "tor purposes of trade."60 
;: 
VI, INVASION OF PRIVACY BY PHOTOGRAPHY 
UNDER THE S 'l'A TUTE 
Warren and Brandeis noted that with the invention of 
the modern devices of communication there would develop more 
and more intensely the need for recognition of the right of 
privacy. The authors noted in particular the fast-growi~g 
:1 use of the flash camera as an almost certain agitator to the 
'I 
!i individual's desire to be let alone,6l 
Fittingly, the first case in New York to charge an 
. invasion of privacy, and the one which led to the passage of 
.. 
: L the civil rights atatute was the result of the abusive use 
of a girl's photograph for purposes of advertising. 
(Roberson v. Rocheater Folding~ Company, footnote 2.) 
This case was, however, preceded by one which 
,. 
'i appeared even before the article by Warren and Brandeis. 
, 
In 1882, eight years before the lawyers' article, the 
' !.!!. !2.!:J!. Times reported a case which had been filed in the 
New York District Court.62 A Marion Moloa, who appeared in 
a Broadway theater playing a part requiring the wearing of 
tights, was photographed surreptitiously from a balcony box 
by two men of the "Castle in the Air" Company who intended 
'i to use the picture in an advertisement, Miss Moloa was 
:: granted an injunction when she asked that the photograph not 
•· 
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li be used, Thirteen years later, when the Naw York laglsla-
It ture was proposing the pr1vac.f statute, the Moloa case c~ra1:1 
: referred to as a precedent-setting ease in which an inj"o.mc-
tton was granted for what constituted an invasion of privacy 
r; for purposes of trade. (Al tlJough the complaint was entered 
' ,, 
'' at the tlme under a property protection. )63 
The statute makes the "rule to be let alone" non-
existent 1n picture taking except if the use ls commercial. 
!: !: The photographer virtually has open season on all exposing 
!! themselves to public view--with the one limitation that he 
:· must not use his photography :f'or commercial or trade pur-
,, posse, without his subject's consent. 
The approbation of someono's photograph for commer-
:' cial purposes has come before the New York courts mot's often 
than any other complaint under the privacy statute. This is 
apparently due to the wid~ use of photography in the field 
p of advert1111ng which, under the statute, is expressly 
defined as a violation. 
' 
The judge in the famous Roberson case, wh1.ch led to 
the enactment of the statute, recognized instantaneous pho-
' 
tography as affording the means of taking a picture of an 
individual "in vitum." However, he did not think the use of 
such inventions should be without restriction. He called 
li 
,I 
ii 
!i 
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: the act of unauthorized picture-taking "a species of aggres-
!i 
i! sion," but nonetheless, an irrepressible feature of the 
,, 
social evolution. The invasion ot privacy, according to the 
judge, occurred when the picture was put to commercial or 
other uses for galn without consent of the subject photo-
graphed,64 
The passing of a statute, providing definite legal 
redress for such an invasion was suggested by the Roberson 
,1 case judge as a prevent! ve power to the violation of one 1 s 
,! 
right to his own portrait. A "preventive power" was exactly 
what the statute turned out to be--or at least as equally 
, preventive of an injustice as corrective of one. 
The statute has posed few problems to honest adver-
tisers. All they need to do to keep within its confines Is 
to secure written consent from any person concerned, They 
pay whatever sum is agreed upon tor such consent, and both 
parties are then protected. 
The more nebulous and dangerous area which, although 
defined in the statute, bas been ruled upon inconsistently 
is the publication not in itself an advertisement, but one 
that promotes trade or advertising. The commercial adver-
tisement leaves l1 ttle doubt as to the existence of t:l.nan-
cial benefit, but the publication which uses a picture to 
6~oberscn v. Rochester Folding ~ COl!!pany, 
171 N.Y. SJB 
====·-'""'"-- ·========~ 
' 
" 
62 
!! promote sales, or add commercial value without actually 
'i 
'' carrying an advertisement "per ae" has been the defendant 
in many "borderline" caaea. 
One such case was an unauthorized publication in the 
i' National Pollee Gazette--a weekly publication carrying 
mostly pictures of pugilists, wrestlers, athletes, vaude-
ville performers, as well as "prize dogs" together with con-
siderable matter that "would aearcely appeal to a refined 
mind , 11 The ratio of reading ma ttar to advertising in the 
magazine was overwhellllingly in favor of the ads. 6S 
The plaintiff, May Colyer, a professional entertainer 
and "high diver," appeared in a picture in the magazine 
wearing her performance costume--the outline for the photo-
graph read, "May Collier, a great trick diver." On the same 
page were four other pictures of female vaudeville perform-
ers, also dressed in costumes together with the words' 
" ••• five of a kind on this page. Moat of them adorn the 
burlesque stage; all of them are favorites with the bald-
headed boya. n66 
The picture was not used in a paid advertisement, but 
Miss Colyer contended that the paper waa nothing more than 
an advertisement sheet published for purposes of trade, 
;, 146 N.Y~!:o~~r v. Richard !• ~Publishing Company, 
66tbid., 1000 
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The court denied any such purpose in the publication 
saying that the a~tute wee not designed to proh:l.bit the 
publication of a person's picture in a daily, weekly or 
periodical paper or magazine. The statute was to prevent 
use of such picture for express advertising or financial 
1 
gain. In thts :tnstsnce the court considered the publ!cation 
of Miss Colyer's picture as justified, since she was well 
known in her field. The court pointed out: 
When the statute was enacted originally in 1903, the 
custom of publishing in papers the portraits of indi-
viduals who were distinguished in their activities of 
life was very general. If the legislature had intended 
to wipe out this custom it could have said ao easily in 
positive language. It did not say so in terms, and the 
courts have proceeded to give the statute full enforce-
ment, within the meaning of its expr~ss provision con-
sidered in the light of its history.07 
The judge's statement again demonstrates the New York 
courts' desire to keep privacy eases limited to clear-cut 
violations of the commercial approbation of one's name or 
picture, and not encompass any further restriction on publi-
cations. 
If tne 1919 Colyer ease is e~pared to another ease 
20 years later. ~ v. F. w. Woolworth Company,68 several 
changes are seen in the attitude of the court. 
The Lane case concerned the placing of an actress' 
, picture in lockets for sale at the counters of a chain of 
67rb1d., 1001 6811 N.Y.S. (2d) 199 
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il five-and-dime stores. JHss Lana sued under the li:ew York 
11 
ii civil rights lew claiming an approbation of her picture for 
!! 
:; trade J!Urposes. The defendant claime~ that the actress' 
i: ,, 
picture was ~1erely to illustrate the use of the locket and 
that 1t ??as des :l.gna ted on the back of the ?ieture that "1 t 
should be replaced with the purchaser's favorite photograph." 
In overruling the defendant's arr-ument, the court stated that 
in actuality Miss Lane's photograph was~ regardless of 
the extenuaUng circumstances. The presidine judge noted 
that if the purchaser of a locket went to the trouble of 
taking the picture out end reading the back, this still did 
not mean that he would not prefer the actress' picture to 
any of his own choice. In fact, his sole reason for pur-
chasing the jewelry might have been to obtain the plaintiff's 
photograph. The court granted relief to the actress stating: 
The photograph was obviously used to bring attention 
to the lockets on display and to make them more attrac-
tive. This is a use for "advertising" and for "trade" 
purposes, The photograph went along with the locket; 
it was sold with the locket. The gratuitous suggestion 
.~, to the purchaser on the back of the pho .. ograph, in 
effect, that if so minded he might replae~ it with a 
photograph more to hia liking--in no way altered the 
fact that plaintiff's photo was actually sold by 
defendant. o9 
In the Lane case it was held that making an article 
more appealing added to its commercial value. However, 20 
years previously, the weekly magazine carrying Miss Colyer's 
69Ibid., 208 
' I! 6~ li ;J 
I! 
ii picture was defanded by the court in its usa of a photcgraph li ;I 
1: which made the publication more appealing and tharefora m(%-e 
saleable. Tha con tradi cttng d<'!lcision:~ both s ":a tad th;~;~ were 
;: trying to stay within ths boundaries tntanded by the privacy 
i[ 
t: t t t ,, a a ,u e. Yet, each found dU'ferent boundaries. 
,! 
~'he consistent justification that the courts rrlv., for 
granting relief as in the Lane case, and yet refus:l.ng 1 t as 
:' in the Colyer case, ie a fact of repetition of the ~mbliea­
:: 
!: i; tion of the picture combined with a lack of the eub.leet's 
consent to uae the picture for pecuniary benefit,. Ths 
:: Amer:l.can .!:!1! Report notes, "Whlle the statute does not pro-
!! hibi t a newspaper from us in?; or publishin~t, in a single issue 
the name and picture of a person without his consent having 
tirat been obtained, when th;, publication :tncludes the sale 
tor profit of a specific it~ containing en individual's 
picture--this 1a a use 'for purposes of trade' and prohibited 
by the statute."70 
In photography there is still an additional problem 
which is neither one of consent nor repetition. This par-
ticular problem involves the rights to the picture--not to 
publication of the picture, but to the commercialization of 
it. The court held in Holmes v. Underwood~ Underwood, 71 
that these rights belong to the sub.1ect of the photograph. 
71233 N.Y.S, 153 (1929) 
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Randall Holmes :hired a photographer to take pi etures 
of a social event at tee Holmes' ee tate. Tte photographer 
made extr·a prints and sold then: to a newspaper which puh-
lished them. The court beld that Mr. Rolmas was entitled to 
damages since: 
It is not the publish:!ng of plaintiff's photot:rnph 
that is at this stage so much material. Rather, it is 
ths sale of such photograph by defendant. That was in 
" furtherance of defendant's trade. It has commercialized 
the photograyh, the rights to which are in the plaintiff. 
The newspaper is not hare sought to be held libel, only 
the photographer can be held responsible.72 
In this judgment is seen an added protection for the 
! publisher under the New York statute, not always afforded at 
common law. The publisher is not held in vir:llatton of the 
priYacy statute since he did not use the picture for commer-
cial purposes. He published it in a singl" issue of the 
newspaper, which, as already shown, is not eonsldered an 
inYasion of privacy in most eases. It was the photographer 
who sold the picture who was guilty of uain~ it for ~1rpoaes 
of trade, and therefore tho one held liable. 
The publisher cannot always be so eert&1n of relying 
on the justification of "single publication" for protection. 
In the ease of McNulty v. Press Publishing Company,73 al-
though the alleged violation consisted of only one publica-
tion of plaintiff's picture, the newspaper was held in 
·. . ·: -li . 
li 
i< 
' 
violation of the privacy statute for using the picture for 
purposes of trade. 
In this case a humorous cartoon of e photograph of 
Joseph McNulty appeared in a small newspaper owned by The 
Press Publishing Company. The cartoon was later sold to 
other papers for publication--thus making usa 0f the picture 
for personal profit and gain.74 
This oaae clos~ly parallels the Holmes case in that 
both photographers were found in violation of the statute, 
not because of publication, but because of selling the pic-
ture without the consent or knowledge of the plaintiff. 
The violations of the privacy statute in the field of 
photography in nearly every ease could have been avoided by 
:i securing the consent of the photographer's subject before 
usi.ng the reproduction. 
There are times when a person walves the right to hia 
picture, thus automatic consent is given to the communicator. 
Cases involving such waiver are important to the eommuniea-
tor sin.ce a knowledge of when he does or does not need the 
consent of his subject to uae the name or portrait could 
often prevent him from violating the New York privacy 
statute. 
,, 
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VII. CONSENT OR REVOCATION OF CONSENT 
FOR THE USE OF NAME OR PORTRAIT 
~e New York privacy statute specifically states that 
a person must not use another's name or portrait for pur-
poses of trade or advertising without written consent.7S 
The distinction between written and oral consent is 
very important in any case where a charge of invasion of 
privacy is brought. In order to recover under the statute, 
the plaintiff must plead and prove as an essential part of 
his cause for action that the use made of his name or pic-
ture, in addition to being a commercial approbation, was 
f"'t! without his written eons•mt. 
In Almond v. Sea Beach Company,76 the defendant 
pleaded that his publication showing Almond entering s 
streetcar was not violating the statute since he had 
received oral consent from the individual to use the photo-
graph. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to an 
injunction to restrain further publication since 2!!1 con-
sent to the use of a person's name or picture does not 
excuse the user from liability under the New York statute.77 
However, the courts will not grant an injunction 
7Suew York Civil Rights Statute, Section So 
76141 N.Y.S. 842 77!!!!.!!., 844 
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·j although justified under the statute, where such restraint 
" ,. 
would not serve the ends of equity and justice. Such was 
'' the reasoning for denying relief to the pla:lntiff in 
'' Wenchell v. Conduit Machine Company, 78 The plain tiff, 
Robert W. Wenchell, after voluntarily posing for a picture, 
sued for an injunction on an invasion of privacy. There-
fore, although written consent is specified by the statute, 
where the court feels tha publication is justified without 
such consent, as in the Wenchell case, the right of the 
plaintiff to the use of his name or photograph is considered 
revoked, 
A person who has secured consent to use another's 
name or picture is not unlimited in th~ use. The court, in 
Garden v, Parfumerie Rlgaud,79 noted that permission is 
revocable. Marjorie Garden had given written consent t~ the 
use of her name in connection with a perfume orieinated and 
manufactured by the Parfumerie Rigaud company. The latter 
secured a trademark for the perfume and invested a large 
amount of money in promoting it, In granting an injunction 
against further use of plaintiff's name, together with 
special damages, the court said: 
It is the well-settled law of this state that a 
gratuitous license--and that is the best that can be 
said of the permission granted by plaintiff--for the 
use of na~e and portrait is revocable at any time 
78133 N.Y.S. 738 (1911) 79271 N.Y.S. 187 
even though action has been taken upon it. The court 
cannot lend itself to the defendant's claim that, 
70 
having trade-marked their article and invested con-
siderable money to popularize it, no revocation is 
possible. It may well be that by revocation serious 
impairment of business will result. But that is a 
danger and risk assumed in accepting a consent un-
limited as to time and against which in the beginning, 
guard could easily be had. Regardless of plaintiff's 
reason for her refusal to continue permission to use 
her name, and even admitting that her motive is 
ulterior and mercenary, it cannot be deniid that her 
name and her portrait are her own and during life solely 
at her disposal.BO 
This decision suggests that whsn wrl tten consent is 
sought by a parson interested in using another'~ name or 
picture, time limitations should be established. By so 
doing, the danger and risk of a law suit resulting from 
acceptance of a conssnt unlimited as to time could be 
guarded against at the outset, as mentioned by the judge 
above. 
Time is not the only limitation of consent. Often 
the person who has secured consent to use someone 1 s name or 
portrait decides to enlarge upon the use intended at the 
time of the agreemsnt. By so doing, he may be violating the 
privacy statute. 
In Young v, Greneker Stud1oa81 the court established 
that consent may be conditional as well as limited. In this 
case, the plaintiff was a profeasional model of clothes in 
80Ibid., 189 8126 N.Y.s. 2d 357 (1941) 
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il the employ of a department store. Her employer sent her to 
:! 
an artist's atudio where a manikin in her likeness was made 
for the exeluaive use of the employer. However, the artist 
made additional manikins from her pose which he sold to 
i various persons. The court allowed her, under the statute, 
to enjoin production and recover damages. Thus, although 
she gave consent to her employer to use the manikin for 
trade and advertising, she did not lose her rip~t to stop 
anyone else from doing the satne.; 
Illustrating the same conditional limits to a eon• 
sent, a man who sued his own corporation for the use of his 
full name in publicity could not recover under the New York 
privacy statute. In White v •. William Q. White Incor-
porated,82 the court said that although Mr. White had pre-
viously conducted a business in his own nama, he had since 
formed a corporation and continued bualness in the name of 
that corporation. By voluntarily giving his name he was not 
entitled to the benefits of the New York statute. 
As indicated by the cases cited, the securing of 
written consent to avoid viola,tion of the privacy statute 
cannot always constitute a defense for using another's name 
or portrait. However, it is the first step which should be 
taken by a person attempting to stay within the limits of 
8245 N.Y.s. 743 (1914) 
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'' the statute. Since under the statute an invasion of privacy 
is so well defined (as compared to the nebulous definition 
;i 
' 
' at common law), the cOllllliUnicator has a safeguard against 
charges of violating a person's right of privacy. By secur-
:1 ing the required written consent, as demanded by the stat-
ute, and in addition, understanding when a revocation of 
this consent can occur, the communicator can protect himself 
from a law suit brought under the civil rights law. 
VIII. SUMIIARY OF THE NEW YORK 
PRIVACY S'l'A'l'U'l'E 
The significance of New York's statutory law on the 
right of privacy has yet to be recognized to its fullest 
extent. By enacting legislature on the right of privacy, 
but not recognizing the right at common law, New York has 
set a precedent which, though slow in ita influence, may 
well be a leader in principle to be adopted by more and more 
states. The statute eliminates much of the hazy definition 
of the right of privacy found in cases entering courts 
recognizing the right at comm~n law. 
Often the "imagined wrongs" mentioned by the judge in 
the Swaker casA, (cited page .~. are given relief at common 
law because of the innumerable definitions ot what consti-
tutes an invasion of privacy. With statutory regulation 
governing the right, as in New York, the definition is clear 
as to the exact limits of such a right. There are, of 
course, exceptions and variations even when a statute exists, 
but these are small when compared to the countless discrep-
ancies and contradictions at common law. 
It for no other reason than to provide specific lim-
its to the right of privacy, and keep charges of violations 
:: of the right within reasonable definition, the New York 
statute is more commendable than the vague outlines given 
-~---4 --- ---.. , .. _,·-LC. .. 
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the right of privacy by common law. Yet, to date, only two 
" states have followed New York in creating statutory law con-
:i 
•i 
:: cerning the right of privacy, and these two still recognize 
the right at common law as well. 
Utah and Virginia patterned their statutes after the 
New York civil rights statute--giving definite relief in the 
form of injunction and special damages to people whose name 
or portrait were used for trade purposea.83 
However, such legislation, in addition to the recog-
nition at common law intenaitiea the danger and punishment 
for one found guilty of invasion of privacy. For separate 
counts may be filed by a plaintiff--one for an invasion 
under the statute tor commercial approbation, and another at 
common law for injury to personal feelings. 
The New York courts have stated clearly that they do 
not recognize any right of privacy not covered by the civil 
rights law. 
The law does not taka cognizance of, and ~ill not 
afford compensation tor, sentimental injury, independent 
of redress, or a wrong involving comm8rcial approbation, 
without consent, ot name or portrait. 4 
Some states have charged that recognition of the 
right by statute would bring e~iticiam as an unconstitutional 
Bh3B !•L•!!• 40 
84Murray v. Gaat Lithographic ~ Engraving Company, 
28 N.Y.S. 271 
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act. The Supreme Court of tbe United States upheld the con-
stitutionality of the civil rights statute as against the 
contention that the statute de,prived the persona of liberty 
and property without due process of law, and that it impaired 
the obligation of contracts. 
In declaring that the public does not have an inher-
ant right to use the names and portraits of others for 
advertising or trade purposes the court said: 
The power of the legislature in the absence of any 
constitutional restriction to declare that a particular 
act shall constitute a crime or be actionable as a tort 
cannot be questioned, where the right established or 
recognized and sought to l)e protected is baaed upon 
ethical sanction. Sueh 18 the character of tte righi; of 
privacy preserved by legislation protecting persona 
against unauthorized use ~f their names or portraits in 
the form of advertisements or trade notices. It is a 
recognition by the law-making power of the very general 
sentiment which prevailed throughout the community 
against permitting advertisers to promote the sale of 
their wares by this method, regardless of the wishes of 
the persons thereby affected. There was a natural and 
widespread feeling that s~ch use of their name and 
portraits in the absence of consent was indefensible in 
morals and ought to be prevented by law.8~ 
This atatement by the Supreme Court that an invasion 
of privacy "ought to be prevented by law" may well be indic-
ative of the future of the right of privacy in other juris-
dictions. 
The decisions ln the New York cases involvJ.ng inva-
sions of privacy lmve demonstrated a general conformity in 
851!~ ~· !!.· ~· 2d 750 ci t!np; 220 U.s. 53 
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;; opinion and definition of the right. It seems reasonable to ,, 
i\ 
assume that as the courts become more and more deluged with 
charges of invasion of privacy under the nebulous defini-
tions afforded at common law, the precedent set by the New 
York legislature in enacting the 1903 civil rights statute 
will be followed more and more often by other states. 
• 
CHAP!SR III 
COMMON LAW RF:COGNITION OF 'rlf.J: RIGHT OF PRI'IACY 
I. BACKGROUND O'F COMMON LAW RECOGNITION 
OF' THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
In all jurisdiettona, except for New York State where 
'' the privacy doctrine has been recognized, protection of the 
I< 
n 
': ri~;ht has bean afforded at common law. Four states have 
:: p 
thus far held firm in refusing relief for an. invad,n of 
i privacy as an 1ndapandent cause for act1<:>n. These sta.tes, 
Rhode Island, Texas, Wiaconain and Washington have, however, 
ii 
granted redress for injury to a person's right to be let 
alone when the injury was based in other charges such as 
libel, trespass or property damage.l 
Recognition of the ri~nt or privacy at common law 
arose as the result of the general acceptance that the right 
was baaed in nstural law. This theory was first suggested 
by Judge Cooley in an English law review and quoted by 
Warren and Brandeis in their 1890 artiele. 2 
It has always been held by law makers that they 
should not be the sole aource of change and growth in law if 
i tb4re was to be appreciable pr!pgreas. It was often held 
!i 
114 American f!! Report! 759 
24 Harvard Law Review 193 
·i 
d 
-;::c;1t .7e-
l' ,, 
il 78 
that such growth came by wa; of na t1.1ral law, a superior body 
ii of lef."&l pr1nci ples, into which juCle-es could dtp to ccrrect 
il 
'' and supplement the existin~ l,aw, The view existinp; at the it 
turn of the century when the rirht of privacy first became a 
major issue 1.n the courts was to consider the con'..mon la11· as 
sufficiently flexible to adapt itaelf to a chang1np, world. 
However, even Warren and Brandeis could not pre<'lict 
P the great change 1n modern life which prompted eon.flieting 
,, theories on the value of natural law. Public media of com-
munication such as newspapers, monthly and weekly magazines, 
moving pictures, radio and television created novel situa-
tions providing more and rr.ore opportunities for violations 
of :!.ndividual rights. Dissenting opinions were heard: 
1be law can often best adjust to and recognize those 
rights which a proper con81deration of history, customs, 
and the demands of social. economic, and moral progress 
require with legislative action. The relation betw~en 
the common lew and natural law is a problem for the 
philosophically 1ncl1ned: but to say the least, natural 
law as a beds for the reaogni t1on of rights has fallen 
inta d1sfevor.3 ~ 
On th~ other hand, a judge, wri.ting on the rlr;ht of 
privacy in 1908 stated: 
It is now well utablished that the right of privacy, 
having its origin in natural law, is immutable and 
absolute and transcenas the power of any authority to 
change or abolish it,4 
319 Kentucky Law Review 103, 104 
4138 American Law Reports 446, 448 
19 
The latter's statement proved to be the accepted 
,! theory regarding the recognition of the right of privacy, 
il although mention of statutory action occasionally appeared, 
:: 
usually with reference to the precedent set by New York. 
A lawyer, Rufus Lisle, in the 1931 Kentucky Law 
Review suggested that neither common law nor statutory 
recognition was needed. 
Privacy, save in perhaps a very taw phases is 
ade~uately protected by e~isting rules of law. If 
additional protection is needed, it can be ada~uately 
supplied by legislature action as was done in New York, 
and the courts will be saved the embarrassment of 
recognizing principles eo~trary to the common law, and 
principles which carried to their logical conclusions, 
will allow recovery in many unjustified cases,5 
Although various and dissenting views were voiced on 
the justifiable recognition of the right of privacy, in all 
states but New York, where the statute was passed early in 
the century, privacy cases were tried at common law. 
In 1936, the theory that natural law provided the 
protection of one's own personality was again voiced, In a 
Pennsylvania case the judge said: 
There is a natural law of privacy in one's own 
affairs which exists in liberty loving peoples and 
nations--for no right is more vital to liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness than the protection of the 
citizeg's private affaire, their right to be let 
alone. 
S19 Kentucky Law Reviaw.446, 448 
6zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F Supp 2d 847 (1936) 
ii 
i: 
ii 
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The reference was to the specific natural law baaed 
!l ii in the United States Constitution, which 1s the foundation 
i' 
:! for common law protection of ,privacy referred to by this 
Pennsylvania judge. He suggested that the right of privacy 
involved a protection of libe:rty and the puraui t of happi-
ness. 
Constitutional authority for the right of privacy 
became widely accepted. Courts referred to both Federal and 
,, State conati tutions as guaranteeing a protection to one 1 s i; 
,. 
:! privacy. Statutory recogniti¢>n, aa the sole basis of relief 
i! for an invasion of privacy, remained tha unique feature of 
:·, 
! New York. 
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States 
Conatitution were most often cited as implying a protection 
for the individual's right to be let alone. In Davis v. 
U. s.,7 in 1946, the court said that the Federal law of 
searches and seizures as based. on the interplay of the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments reflected a dual purpose, one of 
which was protection of the prlvacy of the individual. The 
other was protection against compulsory production of evi-
dence to be used against him.8 
Two years later, in 1948, the Supreme Court of the 
United States stated the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was 
7Davia v. g.~ .• 328 u.s. 582 (1946> 
• 
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to provide the necessary security against unreasonable il 
i! 
:1 intrusions upon the private Uvea of individuals, The 
' i 
if Amendment provided both the protection for the innocent and 
protection for th~ guilty while lesving adequate room for 
' the necessary processes of la• enforcement,9 :; 
:; 
,' 
:; 
This latter consideration, exerc!.se of the pol5.ce 
power, is a violation of the right of privacy which is 
peculiar only to common law recognition of the right,lO It 
is pertinent to this study, not because of any great direct 
influence on the communicatio~ media, but because it illus-
trates the unlimited boundaries that recognition of the 
right of privacy at common law enjoys, as compared to the 
restricted, well-defined borders of statutory recognition. 
The lack of a uniform law protecting the right of 
privacy has resulted in a nebulous definition of the right, 
as well as contradictory court decisions. The vague lines, 
which hava thus far been drawn around the interpretation of 
the right of privacy at common law, have allowed many ques-
tionable cases into the courts. 
Aets of intrusion into pne'a affairs may constitute a 
violation of the right of privacy. Such intrusions may 
include eavesdropping, examination ot private records or 
9Trup1ano v. g.~ •• 334 u.s. 699 (1948) 
1014 American ~ Bepor~s 2d 753 
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1: I' papers, or publication of pel!aonal material identified w1.th 
·i the complainant, in addition to the more obvious viols tiona 
concerning use of photographs or names without consent for 
ii 
advertising, 
As mort:~ and more jurisdictions add their interpreta-
tion of violations of the right of privacy, it becomes 
necessary for the con~unication media to be aware of the 
various actions which have been ruled as violottons of the 
right of privacy ut common law. 
II. QUESTIONABLE INTBUSllONS OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
AT COW.AON LAW 
The American~ Reports, 138, notes that common law 
., recognition of privacy has been "stretched" to recognize 
" 
rights which could find no other label for relief. Among 
such dubious recognitions, the American Law Reports listed 
the posting of debts, invasions by police agencies, and 
opening of public records,ll 
In 1946 a man operating a liquor store charged an 
invasion of privacy when required to open his business 
records for inspection by town and government officials. 
The inspectors, he asserted, were men whom he associated 
with socially at times, and because of this relationship, he 
did not want what he considered the private information of 
his business open to their ins,pection, The court, partly 
because of lack of precedent, did not consider such actions 
an invasion of privacy. The judge stated: 
One who enters into a business or activity subject to 
public regulations (as the sale of alcoholic beverages) 
voluntarily submits his business and recorda and papers 
to such visitorial examination as the law co~templated, 
and in that measure waives his constitutional immunities 
of privacy in respect to such papers.l2 
Although relief was n~t afforded in this caso, it ia 
ll138 American Law Reports 90 
l2sowles v. M1sle, 64 F Supp 835 (1946 DC ~ab) 
:. :::..-;-.::::-::-- ___ , ---
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il :: noteworthy that ~-t was given ,conslderation at all und3r a 
'I ,, 
claim of invasion of privacy, 'l'ha all9gad intrusion here, 
inspaction of records, seams to stray considerably from the 
·! 
confines of the privacy doct:riine as first outlined by 
Warren and Brandeis. This calla does not deal in the Pl'otac-
tion of one's inviolate personality, as the two authors pro-
:; 
il posed would be the main purpose of recogni tlon of th"' ri.ght, 
ii 
Instead, a violation of property right alrgady protected at 
common law was alleged as an invasion of privacy, True, 
'i protection of one 1 s name as "~roperty" has been afforded 
under th3 privacy doctrine, but when such physical property 
:I 
I ~ 
" as business records becomes involved, it is not a matter of 
protecting a part of one's personality, Only at common law 
ooulu such a charge have been brought, since in statutory 
regulation such as the Civil flights Lew in New York the 
interpretation of an invasion of privacy is limited, 
It would se6ll! that in the above case, the fact that 
the information sought in the records of the liquor store 
was for specific official purposes and not for any publica-
tion or comme:rctal1zation, woul.d 1n itst~l.f act as a defense 
for any invasion of pt'lvecy. 
However, in a 1939 case in Georgia seven years before 
:' the liquor store case, such a defense was decided as il11llla te-
' 
11 rial to a charge of invasion or prl vacy •
13 
it il 
~~ 60 Ga A!!•sruss9). A~lanta cqea-Cola !lott~=~-~~~~a-ny,_ -· 
,, 
li 
li 
!I [i 
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;: 
In that case, Leigh McDaniel charged the Coca-Cola 
)' 
1 Bottling Company with invading her privacy by eavesdropping 
with a recording machine while she was a patient in a hos-
ii pital room. Mrs. McDaniel ha'd sued the company for physical 
d ,, 
:! damage done to her by impurities (a cockroach} found in a 
'j 
soft drink manufactured by the company. In order to prove 
that Mrs. llcDanleHi charge was unfounded, the Coca-Cola 
Company installed a recording device in her hospital room 
:
1 
which recorded all private conversations held there. 
" Although the recordings resulted in indicating that no 
damage had occurred to the plaintiff as a result of drinking 
the soft drink, a new charge was brought by Mrs. McDaniel, 
this time for invaeion of her privacy.l4 
The fact that the defendant, in violating the plain-
tiff's right of privacy by eavesdropping, desired and used 
the information obtained for its own information and guid-
ance, and not for publication or colll!llerciallzation, and that 
it did not disclose the information to anyone else, was held 
not to constitute a defense. Krs. McDaniel recovered dam-
;: ages tor the intrusion into her private life by the recording 
of her conversations. 
In these two decisions of the court is illustrated 
the lack of uniformity at common law in defining the right 
14138 American Lew Reports 63 
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of privacy. In one ease, laek of publication or disclosure 
to a third party of the liqu0r records justified the intru-
sion; in the other case, la ell; of publication or disclosure 
: served no purpose as a defense. 
:i !I 
This comparison is important to the field of commu-
il nioations to indicate that the intent when gathering infor-
,, 
!i 
'I 
it 
II p 
I! 
'i 
I! 
il j! 
mation concerning a person's private life can, in some 
instances, mean the difference between what constitutes a 
violation of privacy and what does not. 
The mora consistent decision at common law has been 
to consider malice or lack of it as immaterial in determin-
ing the existence of a right of action for invasion of pri-
)\ 
,
1 
vaey. The truth of the published or communicated matter 
,; 
1
1
!
1
, will not constitute a defense, and the bad faith of the 
actor will not constitute an offense if the communication or 
I' 
tl li 
!i 
II 
,I 
I I, 
!i 
li 
!i 
publication 
prlvacy,lS 
is not otherwise a violation of the right of 
Louisiana set the precedent for placing information 
about an innocent IU.n once charged with crime under the pro-
taction of the common law right of privacy. 
In 190.5 a court in that state said that the publica-
II 
,I tion of an innocent man's photograph in the rogues 1 gallery 
il 
" II I !: 
would give rise to sufficient grounds for an injunction. 
ii 
I' lSnavis v. General Finance and 'l'hrift Company, 
I 80 Calif, App 728 (1956) 
'! 
• 
,.., 
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ii The decision stated: 
I' 
ii 
!; 
1i 
il 
" i! 
There is a right in equity to protect a person from 
such an invasion of private rights. Everyone who does 
not violate the law can insist upon be!P~ let alone 
(the right of privacyl. In aueh a case, the r:f.ght of 
privacy is absolute.~6 
Again the next year, the right of privacy was defined 
I as protecting "the right to be left alone" of the eonvtcted 
I ~ 
il criminal. The Louisiana court decided in this instance that 
ii !i 
II 
:i 
'i 
an inspector of pollee could not take and distribute pie-
turea of a criminal in states where he was not a proven 
ii criminal or fugitive from justice.l7 
I 
'i 
'i 
! 
i! 
fi 
rl 
., ,, 
'i 
! ,. 
,! 
·j 
I· 
! ,, 
'i I 
•I 
II 
!: 
However, the common law right of privacy was sub-
ordinated to the "exercise of the police power" in later 
years in several jurisdictions. It was held that the indi-
vidual's right to preserve his personal seclusion would have 
to give way to the State's "reasonable exercise of the 
police power" and to statutes which made provisions for the 
taking and keeping of fingerprints and photos of persons 
accused of crime.l8 
The taking of accused persons' photographs and 
fingerprints and disseminating them to other law enforcement 
agencies was decided as valid exercise of the police power 
16Itzkov1tch v. Whitaker 11$ La 479, 481 (1905) 
17schulman v. Whitaker, 117 La 704, 707 (1906) 
1814 American Law Reports 21, 61 
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by a Kentucky court si.nce it was "in the public intarest" 
and since ita intant was to provide a method of alding the 
police to apprehend criminals and gather evidence for pres-
:, entation to the court where they were brought to trial.l9 
It was concluaed in this case that the right of pri-
vacy has its limitations and was not always superior to the 
rights of the public but should be construed in the light of 
the individual's relation to the community or sod e ty of 
which he was a m$nber. 
The decision of the Kentucky judge, in holding that 
obtaining data about an accused person did not constitute an 
invasion of privacy stated: 
One who has bean indicted must submit to such slight 
invasion of his claimed right or privacy as may accom-
pany the performance of the police duty required by the 
statute. Being borne in mind that the general object of 
protecting the right or privacy is the protection or 
private life--and when that life ceases to be private by 
reason of indictment and becomes a matter of public 
interest, such steps as the legislature deems right to 
be when in the interest of administration of law, cannot 
be an invasion of privaey.20 
Here is seen the same reasoning for denying relief at 
common law as in the liquor store ease. Both eases were con-
cerned with people who had entered into an "activity subject 
to public regulation." However, in the ease of the accused 
criminal, his privacy was said to have been further waived 
19McGovern v. Van Riper, 98 Ky 114 (1940) 
20Ib1d., 116 
,, 
' 
since he was of public interest. 
89 
It would seem then, that 
'/ common law may define a person's activities as being of 
:! 
"public interest" even when the interest is indirect. In 
i' the criminal case, the photographs and identifying informs-
:! 
' i! tion about the individual were not obtained in order to give 
to the public, but in order to provide protection against a 
matter of general public concern--crime.21 
il 
" In Indiana, two courts confirmed the decisions of the i! 
i! Kentucky court that an accused person's fingerprints and 
photograph were taken in the public interest for the preven-
tion of crime. T,1erefora, even upon acquittal of the indi-
ii 
,, vidual, the courts decided that the state had a duty to keep 
such records on file, and in fulfilling this duty no inva-
sion occurred of the plaintiff's constitutional rights pro-
viding for life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 22 
~~ere arose more "intangible cases chargtng invasion 
of privacy in various forms as recognition of the riGht 
spread into more and more jurisdictions. 
An applicant for a driving permit who was asked to 
submit two personal photos charged such a demand to be an 
! invasion of his privacy. ~e Georgia court denied any such 
violation of the individual's right, stating that the city 
was entitled to require applicants to establish their 
2114 American Law Reports 2d 761 22Ibid. 
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i' 
,, identity as a public safety measure,23 
II 
<I 
The posting of unpaid debts has even been brought 
into the courts as an alleged invasion of privacy at common 
law. 
' In 1927 a Dr. w. R. Morgan aue4 on an invasion of 
,, privacy aa the result of a sign placed in a garage in his 
' ! home town. The sign reach 
!I 
il 
!i 
H 
,i 
Notice 
Dr. w. R. Morgan owes an account here of $49.67. 
And if promises would pay an account, this account would 
have been settled long ago, 'l'hia account will be adver-
tised ae long as it remains unpaid, 
The sign woa of considerable size, five by eight 
tr' feet, and could easily be seen by all passing by, Dr. Morgan 
charged the garage owner with maliciously placing the sign 
in the window. He said it resulted in a great deal of 
chiding from Morgan's friends, The court awarded $1,000 in 
damages to the plaintiff in spite of the garage owner's 
defense that the statements made in the sign were true, and 
' that the doctor had promhed to pay the account when warned 
1! 
that action would be taken.24 
The Morgan case was the tirat brought into the courts 
seeking relief at common law for an invasion of privacy over 
the public announcement of a debt, 
23walton v. Atlanta 89 F Supp 309 (1949 DC Ga) 
24Brenta v. Morsan 221 Ky 76S (1927) 
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A Kentucky court in 1941 supported the decision in 
ii 
'i the Morgan ease by allowing relief on a similar charge. I In 
l! Trammell v. Citizens ~ Companz, 2S the charge was an inva-
,. 
'' sion of pr1 vacy, by a notice of debt published in a daily 
newspaper. The plaintiff owed a certain amount on a grocery 
i' 
account, and the notice requested that he let the creditor I; 
1,1 know if there was any error, and if not to make arrangements 
, for payment. Trammell, the plaintiff, had received a warn-
., 
!! 
1: ing from the creditor that the notice would be published if 
the aoaount remained unpaid. Trammell asked the editor of 
the Citizens!!!! not to publish the notice.26 
The court allowed recovery on the grounds that the 
publication amounted to an invasion of Trammell's privacy 
since the contents of the notice were not matters of public 
interest, but concerned only the creditor and the debtor. 
The court stated that the publisher of the notice knew that 
the notice would tend to expose the plaintiff to public eon-
tempt or disgrace. And although the plaintiff owed the 
amount mentioned in the notices, and the publisher of the 
newspaper was not interested in coercing payment of the debt, 
both the publisher and the creditor were liable to the 
plaintiff for an invasion of pr1vacy.27 
2Sa85 Ky 529 (1941) 
a6Ibid., 530 27Ib1d., 532 
~ .. 
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In both cases, truth as a defense was not allowed. 
!I 
1: Both judges referred to tho principles proposed by Warren 
and Brandeis Which refused recognition of the truth of the 
matter as a defense. 
The reasoning of the col!ll'lon law courts has shown an 
, encouraging consistency when deciding the cases involving 
!1 invasion of privacy by notice of debt. Both cases c1 ted 
'i 
,' above granted relief since the publication was not of gen-
eral public interest, but only produced contempt as the 
result of publication. 
In a case in 1948, relief was not granted on a charge 
of invasion of privacy when the debt notice was not made 
public, but made known only to those concerned.28 
The Indiana court, in Patton v. Jacobs, referred to 
the reasoning of the Kentucky court in the two debt notice 
oases as establishing precedent for that particular type of 
charge. The Indiana court found little similarity between 
the Patton ease and the Kentucky cases to justify granting 
the plaintiff relief. 
The ease involved a creditor, who, in an effort to 
collect a debt owed by Miss Patton, wrote letters to her 
, employer stating the 1'aets and soliciting his aid in col-
:: 
lecting the amount due. The creditor was held not to have 
28Patton v. Jacoba, Ind App 78 Ne 2d 789 (1948) 
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incurred any liability for an invasion of the plaintiff's 
privacy. The court said that there was no logical reason 
93 
i' why a creditor's determination to collect an account could 
" not lead him into a course of conduct const1 tuting a viola-
11 
li tion of the debtor's right of' privacy. However, in most of 
il 
'I i! ths oases i1~ which a recovery was perm! tted the viola t1on 
lay in the fact that the general public was given informa-
:i 
d 
., tion concerning a private matter in which it had no legiti-
lf 
., mate interest. 
In this instance, the court noted that the eommunica-
'· tion was made only to the employer, who had a leg! timate 
i f. 
r. interest in the fact relative to the debts owed by his 
e:aployee. And since the employer was not in the category 
with the general public as to such information, the court 
said it would be difficult to follow a course of reasoning 
justifying the conclusion that Miss Patton's right of pri-
vacy had been invaded by conva7ing to her employer informa-
ii tion which he had a right to lmow. The court dismissed any 
'I li charge that the co=un1ca tion passed through various channels 
:i in the course of business (cierks, stenographers, et cetera) 
saying that such a situation was somewhat analogous to that 
I' of a privileged communication which did not lose its charac-
1! 29 
11 ter through such process. 
II 
II 
li p 29Ib1d., 792 
!I 
~ : 
,, 
" il 
" !i ,, 
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Debt notices, police records, uualness records, theee 
,, are classifications in which a violation of the right of pri-
vaoy has extended at coll!l1lon law. The co.'ll.'!lunica tlons media, 
,, 
11 
'' interested in report and comment upon all of life, must take 
i! il these special classifications into consideration when 
:I 
I I! t•ev1ew1ng the entire scope of the limits posed by the ri eht 
" i of privacy. 
Fields of established precedent incurring violations 
of the individual's desire to be let alone--advertising, use 
' of name, use of picture, reporting of news--have been dis-
cussed aa they were recognized in New York State under stat-
; ,, 
,, 
utory law on the right of privacy. The decisions in the 
same fields when handed down at eo~'!lon law have entailed a 
variety of reasoning, justifying the warning of Judge Clark 
in the New York Roberson ease, that recognition of the r:l.ght 
, would lead to a vast amount of litigation bordering on the 
absurd.3° 
30Roberson v. Rochester Folding~ Co., 171 N.Y. 538 
' . 
.--~ 
III. PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
AT COMMON LAW 
IN THE FIELD OF ADVERTISING 
Commenting on the right of privacy, the American 1!! 
Reports noted: 
'i ,,
,, 
li 
' ,, 
'I !I 
ir 
Modern methods of advertising and publicity have 
accentuated such need to the extent that now, in every 
state that recognizes the doctrine, the unauthorized 
use of name or picture of a person for commercial 
purposes, sa a g1neral rule, is held to be an invasion 
of his privacy,J 
The recognition at common law of the right of a per-
son to keep his picture or name from being used unwarrantedly 
in advertisements is very similar to the statutory recogni-
tion. Use in advertising is the most well-defined infringe-
ment of the right in the common law court, and the one which 
has shown the most consistent rulings and reasonings within 
the various jurisdictions. 
The major principle behind the awarding of damages in 
injunctions to plaintiffs is the theory that if a man pos-
sesses something of value in his personality or countenance, 
!' then he should be the t:l.rst to receive the commercial benefit 
from it. A 1907 New Jersey court noted that: 
If a man's name be his own property, as no lees an 
authority than the u. s. Supreme Court aa1s (Brown 
Chemical Compan? va. Meyer, 139 U. s. 540l, and if the 
peculiar cast o one's features ia also one's exclusive 
3114 American f!! Reports 2d 772 ii 
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property, it is difficult to understand why the pecuni-
ary value, if there is one, does not belong to the owner 
rather than the person seeking to make an unauthorized 
use of them.32 
Four years later, a Missouri court referred to the 
same issue, that if a person has "peculiarity of appearance" 
,. and if it is made an article of merchandise, why then, should 
i; 
!\ 1 t not be tor his own benet1 t? 
I\ 
The court said: 
,I 
!! It is a right Which he may wish to exercise for his 
own profit, and why may he not restrict another from 
using it for gain? If there is value in it, sufficient 
to excite the cupidity of another, why is it not the 
property of him who gives it the value and from whom 
the value spr1ngs?33 
Although common law recognitions of a violation of 
privacy in advertising have bean similar to the recognition 
afforded by the statutory law of New York--the common law 
recognition has afforded relief for damage to personality or 
feelings by publication of an advertisement, as well as for 
purposes of trade or advertising. Affording relief on this 
additional count--injury to personality--has been the cause 
of dissimilarities in the common law courts' reasoning. 
A ease in Georgia in 1905 proved to be a precedent-
setting one. The court in Paveeich v. !!! England Mutual 
~ Insurance Company granted relief tor damage to personal 
feelings as the result of an advertisement and also issued 
32Edison v. Edison Polyform Ktg. Company, 73 N.J. 
Eq 136 (1907) 
33Mypden v. Harris, 1$3 Mo App 652 (1911) 
:i 
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;i 
Ji an injunction to prohibit further collllllercial use of the 
II 
,; 
l 
:I 
II ,, 
![ 
" ii 
!I 
ii 
!i 
i! 
r! 
II 
il 
'I li 
ii 
i' ,! 
;i 
plaintiff's photograph. The plaintiff's picture had been 
put in the paper by the :!.nsurance company with the statement 
that he was protected by a policy with the company. Whereas 
a sickly, poorly dressed man whose picture was beside the 
plaintiff's in the publication, was noted as not being 
insured with the company. The court, in granting relief 
said: 
If one's picture may be used by another for adver-
tising purposes, it may be reproduced and exhibited 
anywhere. If it may be used in a newspaper it may be 
used on a poster or placard. It may be posted upon 
the walla of private dwellings, or upon the street. 
It may ornament a brothel. By becoming a member of 
society, neither man nor woman can be presumed to have 
consented to such uses of the imprgpsion of their faces 
and features upon paper or eanvaa.J4 
In this statement no reference is even made to the 
fact that the picture was used for the monetary gain of the 
insurance company. Concentration here is upon the great 
:i 
'I 1 danger to one 18 persons.l feeling and reputation if unwar-
,1 
ji ranted use of one 1 8 feelings cannot be controlled. In fact, 
!i 
i throughout the decision, the court had little to comment on 
•' the injustice of publishing the picture without allowing the 
subject of the photograph his due compensation. The empha-
,i sis instead was placed upon the embarrassing results of the 
I 
11 advertisement. 
!I 
The court also noted that such publication 
I' ij .34Paves1ch v. New England 
!1 Company, 122 O:a 190 <m5) 
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;; in.fringed upon the constitutional rights of an individual to 
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voice his own opinion. The court called such a violation an 
act bordering on enslavement, stating: 
Such conduct is not embraced within the liberty to 
print, but is a serious invasion of one's right of 
privacy, and may, in many oaaea, according to ~he cir-
cumstances or the publication and the uees to which it 
is put, cause damages to flow which are irreparable in 
their nature. The knowledge that one's features and 
form are being used for such purpose and displayed in 
such places as such advertisements are often .found, 
bri.ngs not only the perscn of an extremely aensi ti ve 
nature, but even the individual of ordinary sensibility, 
to a realization that his liberty has been taken away 
from him ••• and that he is under the control of another, 
he is no longer free, he is in reality a slave without 
hope of freedom, held to service by a merciless mastsr.3S 
The "irreparable damages" referred to here include 
not only the easily defined violation of publishing one's 
picture without consent for commercial purposes, but extend 
to the display o.f the picture in embarrassing or unsuitable 
situations ("brothels, barrooms, etc.") and the resulting 
damage to one's .feelings. The latter consideration was 
never allowed where the New York statute governed the deci-
a aion. 
I; 
!i 
The relief stayed within the boundaries of eompensa-
;· 
•! tion for commercial use of one's picture or name. 
However, the Pavesich ease was the precedent which 
was followed by later courts in cases involving invasion of 
ii privacy by advertising. 
,, 
ii 
Ji 
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In a Kentucky case a few years after the Paveaich 
decision, much of the same reasoning was offered in award-
ing damages to the plaintiff in Foster Milburn Company v, 
Chinn,36 The defendant was a ~anufacturer of Doan's Kidney 
pills, and to advertise the pills, published a directory 
called Doan's Directory. In this, the company printed a 
picture of J. P, Chinn and under the picture were the words: 
Senator Chinn, famous Kentucky horseman gives 
testimony. Was cured by Doan'a Kidney Pills when 
miserable in the back. Senator Jack Chinn is a 
prominent figure in the Blue Grass country of 
Kentucky--known for 1ts fine horses and beautiful 
women. Colonel Chinn, who is very popular and well 
known was walking with Governor Goebels when the 
" latter was fatally ahot. Col. Chinn aays he is glad 
to acknowledge the benefit he has derived from using 
Doan 1s Kidney Pilla, 
'!'his advertisement was alleged to have been so inju-
rious to Chinn that he hld to seek medical care as a direct 
result. The court apparently was of the view that the pub-
:: licationln question constituted libel if it subjected the 
:: plaint:!.ff to ridicule or contempt. But the court also 
,, expressly affirmed the right of the plaintiff to recover for 
i 
the violation of his right of privacy. ~1e court noted: 
There ia an important difference between verbal 
slander and a written or printed publication. Words 
verbally spoken are not actionable "per ae" ordinarily, 
unless they impute a crime, but words which are written 
or printed are actionable when they subject the person 
to disgrace, ridicule, odium, or contempt in the 
36134 Ky 424 (1909) 
i; 
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estimation of friends and acquaintances or the public. 
How far the publication in question would subject a 
person to ridicule or contempt or make him odious is 
for the jury. While there is some conflict in the 
authorities, we conclude with those holding that a 
person is entitled to the right of privacy as to his 
picture, and the publicatjon of the picture of a person 
without his consent, as a part of an advertisement for 
the purpose of exploiting the publisher's business is a 
violation of the right of privacy. 
The court also noted that the letter purporting to be 
from Sena to.r Chinn waa forged 1n order to give weight to the 
advertisement. Although it was a custom in the press to 
publish pictures of prominent public men such as senators, 
it was a vary different thing for a manufacturer to use 
without authority such a man's name and picture to advertise 
goods in connection with a forged letter indorsing the 
products. 
The words of the court in this decision lend support 
to the theory of Warren and Brandeis that "the right of pri-
vacy can only be violated by printings, writings, pictures, 
!I or other permanent publications or reproductions and not by ,, 
word of mouth.~37 
Another general characteristic of the right of pri-
vacy, listed in the 1890 article by the two authors stated: 
!' "It (the right of privacy) doea not exist where the person 
has published the matter complained of, or consented thereto." 
374 Harvard Law Review 211, 
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This principle constituted part of the reasoning of a Rhode 
;[ 
![ Island court denying a plaintlt'f relief from an alleged 
invasion of his privacy by an advertisement. 
In this case, O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Company,38 
O'Brien, a college All~American football player sued because 
his picture appeared on a calendar which contained pictures 
of the year's All-American team with a Pabst beer advertise-
ment. Because O'Brien was a member of a youth group opposed 
to alcohol, he said he was embarrassed and humiliated by the 
advertisement. 
The defending beer company argued that O'Brien was a 
public figure, that he had given consent to the Uni.veraity 
Athletic Department to dis tribute the picture of the team, 
and in addition, that he could not show injury to person, 
property or reputation. The court's verdict to deny redress 
relied on all three defenaea.39 
The reasoning of the court is not ccmpletely clear. 
It would seem as though public figure and waiver were con~ 
sidered interchangeable without coneldering special circum-
stances. The court noted that the publicity the athlete 
received was only that which he had been constantly seeking 
and receiving as a nationally famous football player. 
But had he been seeking publicity by Pabst? The 
39tbid •• 169 
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' court did not seem to consider this pertinent--nor did 1 t 
!I 
:! 
'I 
even mention the question of commercial benefit received by 
the advertiser while O'Brien got no compensation whatever. 
The court said: 
Nothing in the picture of O'Brien with beer could 
possibly disgrace or reflect on or cause him damage 
since nothing in the picture could be legitimately 
construed as falsely stating that he uapd, endorsed, 
or recommended the use of Pabst's beer.40 
That is questionable, however. The photograph did 
help sell the beer, otherwise why would Pabst go to the 
' trouble and expense of advertising? 
On the question of waiving his right to publication 
by having given consent to the school to use the picture, 
the court reasoned that since he had decided and given con-
sent to follow the University's judgment, he could not 
complain. 
A North Carolina court in Flake v. Greensboro !!!! 
Company,4l indicated the relationship between property 
rights as recognized at common law. The case concerned the 
publishing of an advertisement for a bakery company which 
tied in weight control by ueing the picture of an "exotic 
red-haired Venus" from the Folies de Fares. H~~&ver, by 
mistake the actual Folies performer's picture was not ueed, 
but the picture of the plaintiff, a model end en aspiring 
actress, was uaed instead. 
41212 N.C. 780 
.-.- 11-
~ i 
In granting damages to the plaintiff, Justice 
Barnhill made a distinction between property and privacy 
rights: 
Strictly speaking, there are no property rights. 
103 
All rights are individual. A person has a right to 
possession, control, uss and disposition of property. 
This right is as personal as the right to individual 
liberty, tree speech, or any other like right possessed 
by a citizen. The individual right which relates to 
property is loosely termed a property right. Some of 
the cases dealing with the "rig~~ of privacy" treat it 
as a species of property right.42 
Reference to the injustice of using one's likeness or 
name for commercial benefit without consent was included in 
the judge's decision: 
It would be, in my opinion, an extraordinary view, 
which, while conceding the right of a person to be 
protected against the unauthorized circulation of an 
unpublished lecture, letter, drawing, or other ideal 
property, yet would deny the same protection to a 
person whose portrait was unauthorizedly obtained and 
made use of for commercial purposes. The right to be 
protected would be conceded if she had eat for her 
photograph, but if her face or portraiture has a value, 
the value is hera e~cluaively until the use be granted 
away to the publ1c.43 
At common law, aa under atatutory law. the adver-
tiser seeking to avoid any violation of an individual's 
right of privacy cannot underestimate ths value of obtaining 
consent from anyone whose picture or name is tc be used. 
There is an additional factor which must be recog-
nized by the advertiser. At common law relief can be 
43!M.\!., 784 
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granted for the damaging of one's feelings in addition to 
the relief given for using the name or photograph for com~ 
mercial purposes. For this reason, the specif:l.c purpose for 
which the person's name or photograph is to be used must not 
be changed after receiving consent from the individual. 
The nabt·.lous dafin1 tion of ths prtvacy doctrine 
.i 
il becomes more and more vague in fields where there :ts no com-
,, 
" mercial purpo~>s alleged, but where only feelings are said to 
be damaged. 
··-·===iF======= 
~ -
IV, RECOGNITION OF PUBLIC INTEREST IN "NEWS" 
AS A PROTECTION FOR COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA 
AGAINST CHARGES OF INVASION OF PRIVACY 
"The right of privacy does not prohibit any publjca-
tion of matter which is of public or general intereat,"44 
Time and again, this principle laid down by Warren and 
Brandeis as one of the limitations of the right of privacy 
baa acted as a protection for the communications media. 
However, since the 1890 article, the principle of 
"public or general intereat" has often been referred to by 
the courts as "legitimate news." Therefore, another basis 
for endleas controversy arose in determining exactly what 
would constitute "legitimate" news. A lawyer writing in the 
Journalism Quarterly noted that a survey of eases decided 
within the last taw years would show that the courts had 
applied the doctrine of "legitimate" news to reach decisions 
which conflicted with each other and with older cases in 
such a way that no actual principles could be extracted tor 
the guidance of the press.4S 
Cases holding that the general public interest caused 
a person, willingly or unwillingly, to lose his right to 
~ Harvard Law Review 211 
1: 4SBorr1a G. Davia, "Invasion of Privacy: A Study in ;i Contradictions," Journalism Quarterly, XXX (Spring 1953>, 
i p. 127 
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privacy 
courts. 
right. 
between 
were seriously challenged in many eases filed in the 
Legal scholars hailed this challenge as just and 
They presented the principle that the distinction 
"public" and "private" character was no longer 
acceptable. Yet, the courts continued to apply a doctrine 
of public interest which in some of the decisions was very 
little different from the idea of a public character.46 
The central reasoning of the courts in "legitimate 
news" rulings has been based in the theory that the interest 
of society in being informed is another limitation to the 
right of privacy, so that anyone becoming involved in mat-
tars of news interest must submit to the resulting publicity. 
,, Also, those seeking notoriety or having it thrust upon them 
i 
would be held to have waived their right to personal 
exclusion. 
Such a waiver was assumed to have occurred in the 
ease of Berg v. Minnesota ~ ~ Tribune Company, 47 where 
H. Berg had sued his wife for a divorce and she in turn was 
contesting the action in order to set aside the decree and 
to obtain custody of the children. By entering into such 
legal proceedings, the Bergs were held to have "thrown aside 
the mantle or privacy," so that the publication or his 
Supp 
46rb1d.' 129 
47f•reev· Minneapolis Star Tribune Company, 79 F 
9$7 19 ) 
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' 1! photograph, taken in the courtroom, did not invade his pri-
., 
vacy, if such a right existed in the state. The court said: 
The undeniable fact is that he had made public the 
most intimate and indeed aeandalous occurrence• of his 
domestic life and had them spread on the public records 
of a court of his choosing, and in so doing he departed 
from his quiet, peacefUl life tree from the prying 
curiosity and unmitigated gosaip which accompanies fame, 
notoriety, and scandal and in a sense, became a quasi-
public figure in the c~unity and particularly in his 
own strata of society.40 
Concluding that the repOrt of the divorce court pro-
ceedings was a legitimate subject of news, the court pointed 
out that the photograph complained of did not present an 
inaccurate or distorted picture of the proceedings; the 
judge went on to say th&t if the plaintiff, by suing hie 
wife made himself a legitimate item of news, it would seem 
that the personal appearance of participants in the pro-
ceedings by way of photographs was a matter in which the 
public would have a legitimate interest. 
A Kentucky court confirmed Warren and Brandeis' 
theory that a person engaged in an activity of public inter-
est could not seek protection under the right of privacy. 
In Jones v. Herald ~ Company,49 a newspaper published a 
story after Mrs. Jones' husband was stabbed in her presence. 
The paper said: 
Mrs. Jones heroically attacked both men, striking 
them before they could flee. She allegedly said, 
48Ib1d., 958 49230 Ky 227 
... =·== 
;l. .. 
"I would have killed them, 
them. I struck the tall one, 
woman hasn't a chance against 
have killed them I would have 
him someday." 
I tried. 
but they 
brutes. 
done so. 
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I fought with 
got away. A 
But it I could 
I will revenge 
The plaintiff said that the picture published of her, 
together with the false statement in the story, subjected her 
to ridicule and invaded the domains of her private lite. The 
court considered the story quite clearly outside of any right 
ot privacy protection, since Mrs. Jones had waived any such 
right by engaging in a public event. 
The acceptance at common law of the Warren and 
i! 
,, 
i: 
I 
ii 
I 
·' 
,, 
,, 
Brandeis doctrine concerning a news figure was again demon-
strated in an Ohio court 1n 1938. An actress sued a theater 
tor the invasion ot her right ot privacy by the displayal of 
her picture together with pictures of nude burlesque dancers. 
The actress maintained that such a publication of her picture [. 
! 
had done great damage to the high reputation of character, 
morals, ability and talent in her profession. She charged 
that she had spent large sums of money in publicizing her-
self as a legitimate actress, and that the photograph of her, 
displayed among "lewd and vulgar-type pictures ot low order" 
negated all of her ettorts. 60 
The court took the view that the nature of her 
career, together with the admission of her quest tor public-
6<iiarti.Q v. !!!. Theatre, 10 Ohio App 338 (1938) 
I• 
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,, 
:: i ty, deprived her of any right ot pr1 va cy that might exi at 
i 
,i in favor of a private individual. The placing of her photo-
'i 
: graph in undignified company did not affect the question of 
'I ji invasion of the ri~~;ht of privacy--that would have to be an 
,, 
;! 
:i action for libel. The court said: 
,, 
Persons who 9Xpoae themselves to the public view for 
hire cannot expect to have the same privacy as the meek, 
plodding, stay-at-home citizen. The glamour, genuine 
or artificial, of that business removes the participants 
therein from the realm of the average citizen. Actres-
ses and actors seek publicity and often adopt various 
and sundry ways of securing such notoriety as will 
attract attention to them.~l 
Because of this, the court stated that such indivi-
duals cannot expect to lead quiet, secluded lives; they must 
expect to be criticized justly or unjustly for their perform-
, ances. Thus, the court ruled that it saw no cause for action 
and denied the plaintiff relief. 
The three cases cited demonstrate the protection the 
communication media have against charges of invasion of the 
.i right of privacy. As long as the matter is publicized as a 
"legitimate" news item, there is no danger of an invasion of 
privacy--either by damage to one's feelings or by a commer-
cial use of a name or photo. 
·' 
However, the protection is not so cut and dried. As 
Norris Davis noted in the Journalism Quarterly article, a 
S1It>ici., .3.39 
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,i survey of the past cases decided at common law tend to con-
fuse as much as clarify the question of what constitutes 
"news," 
The court's reasoning in the case just cited involv-
ing Miss Martin, the actress, ia difficult to equate with 
the reasoning of the court in the Flake v. Greensboro News 
Company, cited earller in the study, In both instances, the 
plaintiffs ware actresses (see page 102); neither gave con-
sent to the use of her picture. Yet in the Flake case, 
where the girl's picture was used as a "tie-up" with a 
bakery advertisement, relief was granted for an invasion ot 
privacy. In the Martin case, where the pict~re was used to 
attract customers to entertainment, relief was denied. 
The most significant difference in the two cases for 
reporters to note might well be what actually constitutes 
the major difference between recognition of the right of 
privacy under statutory law or at common law. In the Flake 
case, the plaintiff sought relief on the grounds that she 
did not receive the pecuniary benefits that ware rightfully 
hera as a result of the bakery advertisement. In the Martin 
case, the plaintiff claimed da!ll8.ge to feelings, Although 
both cases were brought into court at common law, the one 
which stuck within the boundaries outlined by another state 
in statutory law, concerning commercial use, was the one 
i· 
11 granted redress for an invasion of the right of privacy. 
i! 
1! 
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Both plaintiffs ware actresses--and therefore both 
> should have been subject to the same def1ni tion as public 
figures. Yet where an unwarranted use of face or name 
occurred for commercial purposes, the court deemed a viola-
' tion of privacy had occurred. 
Even under statutory law, as in the Sidis case in Hew 
York, there are discrepancies as to what constitutes news 
and what constitutes a violation of the "commercial or trade 
purposes" statute. 
The major question, both at common law and where a 
statute exists, seems to be: "What can be defined as pub-
lishing matter for 'trade' or financial benefit?" After 
all, doesn't every publisher print stories that he hopes will 
sell his paper? Yes, but the fact that the public is inter-
ested and "needs to know" the greater part of what is pub-
lished justifies, in the eyes of the courts, any commercial 
profit resulting from the publication. 
The definition of What the public needs to know as 
against what he needs to keep private is much less defined 
,, and limited than under statutory law. 
A controversial and famous case entered the CaHfor-
nia courts in 1931 to establish a new precedent in that 
state, as 
privacy. 
well as add a new interpretation to the right of 
In Melvin v. Reid,52 the court, hesitant to 
52112 Cal App 28$ (1931) 
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recognize the right of privacy independently of a statute, 
based its decision on a provision of the state Constitution. 
The provision referred to guaranteed to all citizens the 
ri~ht of "procuring and obtaining eafety and happiness." 
The plaintiff, Gabrielle Darley Melvin, was suing the 
company that produced a motion picture entitled, "The Red 
Kimono," for an invasion of her right of privacy, The com-
pany had used her maiden nama and the incidents surrounding 
her early life as the basis for a motion picture. 
Mrs. Melvin had, before her marriage to Bernard 
Melvin, been engaged in a life of prostitution. She had 
been tried for a murder, and after her acquittal she had 
completely given up any pursuit of her former profession, 
but had settled down to a position as a respected, socially 
accepted housewife in a community where her past was not 
known. Because of the production of the movie, which was 
advertised as being the true life story of Gabrielle Darley, 
Mrs. Melvin claimed she was held in contempt by her friends 
and suffered great embarrassment. 
The court noted that under the principles of the 
right of privacy previously set by other jurisdictions the 
use of the incidents of the plaintiff's earlier life was not 
in itself actionable. These instances, it was noted, 
appeared in the records of her trial for murder, records 
i! which were public and open to the inspection of everyone. 
II 
,! 
,, 
'I 
!: 
II 
Ji 
113 
If the defendants had used only these incidents, there would 
have been no grounds for recovery,$3 
However, according to the presiding judge, it was the 
use of the plaintiff's maiden name together !1!h ~ adver-
tisement that made use of the incidents of her life an 
invasion of privacy, 
The court, in clarifying its stand on the right of 
privacy "per se" stated: 
In the absence of any provision of law, we would be 
loath to conclude that the right of privacy as the 
foundation for an action in tort in the form known and 
recognized in other jurisdictions, exists in California. 
We find, however, that the fUndamental law of our State 
contains provisions which, we believe, permit us to 
recognize the right to pursue and obtain safety and 
happine§~ without improper infringements thereon by 
othera,54 
The relief granted by the court was for the violation 
of this constitutional right to live free from attack on 
one's liberty, property and reputation,55 
The judge did not once state that he was recognizing 
a right of privacy in granting the relief to the plaintiff, 
However, he stated that the first cause for action filed by 
Mrs. Melvin was the baaia on which the court would grant 
redress. This first cause, aa listed by the plaintiff, was 
"a violation of the right of privacy,"56 
.53!MJ!., 298 
$$Ibid,, 290 
S4Ibid., 289 
$6Ibid,, 28.5 
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This case again provides an interesting comparison 
between recognition of the right at common law and recognl-
tion under statutory law, In the case above, as in the 
Sid is "boy genius" case cited in Chapter II of this study, $7 
': the plaintiff had, years prior to the publication, retired ii 
! 
'i 
from the type of life that would have warranted or invited 
public scrutiny. In both cases the plaintiff had made every 
effort to live in retirement and to avoid publicity, In the 
Melvin case the earlier life of a ret'ormed prostitute was 
made the subject of a motion picture, while in the Sidle 
case the early exploits and present retirement of a former 
child prodigy were made the subject of a maga~1ne article, 
Recovery was permitted in the former complaint and denied in 
the latter. Why? 
Neither figure could be said to have been of current 
public interest, Both had been forgotten until publicized 
anew, Yet, one under statutory law was called "newsworthy" 
and thus not entitled to the protection of the right of 
privacy, while the other at common law was held entitled to 
recover under the right. 
Here again the answer is mainly the fact that statu-
tory law confines the relief granted under it to specific 
instances. The Sidis case, under the New York statute, had 
i' 
i! 57cf. Chapter II, Statutory Recognition of the Right 
,J of Privacy 
,, 
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to ahow a uae of the man's name or picture for trade pur-
poses. Since the article was deemed "newsworthy" the mere 
fact of publication could not claesify it as helping the 
trade or commercial purposes of the magazine. Whereas the 
common law recognition, based in the Constitution of Cali-
fornia, needed no evidence of exploitation of the plain-
tiff's life history for pecuniary benefit, but only needed 
to show a violation of the right to pursue one's individual 
happiness. 
Another case in California eight years later followed 
.. --
the Melvin precedent. In Mau v. Rio Grande 011 Incorporated,5S 
-- - : 
the plaintiff was awarded damages for an invasion of privacy 
that caused him mental suffering and loss of job, The spon-
sor of a radio program was held liable for an invasion of 
privacy when a dramatization of the plaintiff's life wae 
broadcast without consent. Mau, the plaintiff, was a chauf-
feur who had been the victim of a holdup where he was robbed 
and shot. As a result of the ordeal the chauffeur allegedly 
suffered a nervous breakdown. One and a half years later, 
when the plaintiff had fairly recovered he heard a dramati-
zation of the holdup on the radio, complete with his real 
name, Mention of the holdup caused a nervous relapse pre-
venting Mau from driving and thus depriving him of work. 
5828 F Supp 845 (Applying the law of California 1939) 
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In this case, as in the Sidle case, the subject did 
not seek publicity; he had no control of the events causing 
it, He was granted relief at common law, whereas statutory 
law provided no redress for Sid1a. 
There is a contradiction that appears frequently in 
the courts when a common law case charging an invasion of 
privacy is entered, This contradiction concerns the prin-
ciple suggested by Warren and Brandeis that the right of 
privacy cannot be violated by word of mouth. 
Although the authors steadfastly maintained, and 
courts have strictly upheld the principle that oral communi-
cation does not constitute an invasion of privacy, radio 
stations have been held subject to the same liability as 
other communication agencies, The courts in these instances 
have not even glanced at the fact that such communication was 
oral. 
Relief was not granted the plaintiff in Smith v. 
: ~.~9 for an invasion of privacy. The reasoning of the 
court had nothing to do with the fact that the alleged 
invasion was made over the radio, however. 
G. J. Smith was the daughter of a man who had dis-
appeared from the community, and for whose murder an inno-
cent man had been tried and later acquitted. After the 
59251 Ala 250 (1948) 
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ii father reappeared, a radio narrative carried the story of 
I' :: the disappearance, the trial and the final reappearance. 
The daughter alleged that her privacy had been invaded by 
the radio broadcast. The court said that the program was 
the subject of legitimate public interest, since by his own 
acts the father had made himself a public character. 
Again, the court made no mention of the principle 
requiring an invasion of privacy to be more than an oral 
' publication in the case of Cohen v. Marx.60 A professional 
:! 
boxer, once known as 11 Canvasback Cohen," sued radi.o comedian 
Marx for a comment the latter made on the rad:l.o. The come-
dian had said on a program, "I once managed a prizefi.ghter, 
Canvasback Cohen. I brought him out here, he got knocked 
out and I made him walk back to Cleveland." 
It was said by the judge that a person who by his 
accomplishments, fame, mode of life, or by his chosen pro-
fession gives the public a legitimate interest in his 
affairs becomes a public figure and thereby forfeits part of 
his right of privacy. Applying this rule the court said: 
When the plaintiff sought publicity and adulation 
of the public he relinquished his right of privacy on 
matters pertaining to his professional activity and he 
cannot at his will and whim draw himself like a snail 
6094 Cal App 2d 704 (1949) 
" 
.ll8 
into a shall and hold others liabl;' for commenting upon 
the acta which had taken place whe~ he voluntarily 
exposed himself to the public eye,Ol 
Thus, though the broadcast~r was not held liable for 
his remark, th~ reason for his exoneration was not because 
the publication had been an oral one. 
The tendency of the courts to refrain from mentioning 
the Warren and Brandeis prtnciple that an invasion of prt vacy 
must be oral perhaps indicates clearly tha ad,1ustment of the 
law to the twentieth century society. When the lawyers sug-
gested the principles govern1ng the ri.ght of privacy in 1890 
the term "oral" could only mean a publication to those with-
in hearing distance of the person speaking. The authors 
could not at that time have made allowance for radio and 
television as mass media making it possible for an oral pub-
lication to reach around the world. 
Contradictions are not only found at common law 
between jurisd1.ct1ons, but can be found within the same 
courtroom. In Metter v. Los Angeles Examinar62 the court 
held that th~ husband of a woman who had leaped to her 
death from a twelfth-floor building in downtown Los Angeles 
could not demand that the newspaper not print her picture. 
The husband claimed that :l.n his state of shock and grief 
publication of h1a wife's picture would violate his right to 
6235 Cal App 2d 304 (1939) 
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be let alone, free from the scrutiny of morbid public curi-
ii osity, The court's reasoning was that the woman had placed 
!I ii her actions in the domain of public interest by c,.,mmi ttt11g 
suicide--an action unusual en..,ugh to ar,use public l.nterest. 
1 Yet, at the same ttme in a brief dictum of one sentencs, the 
court observed that: "Public o~ general interest as a defense 
''for the newspaper should not be contused with mor11 eurt,.,sity." 
This examole of contradictory reasoning has often beAn ~1ted 
by other courts as an indication of a need for uniformity in 
the common law recognition of the ri~ht of nrlvae~.63 
i'he question of what axaetl:v oonsti,tutes a newsworthy 
subject has not been concretely answered by the co~on law 
courts. However, each court trying a case, especially where 
" no commercial use of name or picture has occurred, has been 
: 1 faced with a similar decision, A court faced with s ease 
:· 
i' ,,
I' il 
'I I, 
'I I, 
it 
involving the right of privacy must balance the lndhidual's 
interest in his privacy against the social right of free com-
ment and circulation of information. It has been recc~nlzed 
that the individual right of privacy cannot be melnta,ned to 
protect from publication matters which are legitimate subjects 
of public interest and comment. It is the interpretatinn of 
what is "legitimate" that needs a more universal treatment, 
Statutory recognition may be the answer, giving to the inter-
pretation of the doctrine of privacy more well-defined limi-
te tions. 
63Dav1a, Journalism Quarterly, ~· £!!., p, 183 
'i 
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V, RECOGNITION AT COMMON LAW OF INVASION 
OF PRIVACY BY PHOTOGRAPHY 
It was pointed out in the classic article by Warren 
and Brandeis that "instantaneous photographs and newspaper 
enterprises have invaded the sacrad precincts of private and 
domestic life; that numerous mechanical devices threaten to 
make good the prediction that what is whispered in the 
closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops," With radio 
and television that is a considerable understatement. They 
also said that "the unauthorized circulation of portraits of 
private persons and the evil of invasion of privacy by the 
newspapers" requires a remedy,64 
The writers' conclusion was that common law could 
'! provide the needed remedy. However, an examination of the 
eases charging invasion of privacy by photography tend to 
indicate that the authors did not anticipate the inconsist-
encies that would appear in common law decisions. Perhaps 
something more than tradition and precedent are needed now 
to bring universal recognition of the right, 
OUtstanding among the common law cases involving 
photography was one which entered the Supreme Court of 
" Misaour1 in 1942. In Barber v. Time, Incorporated, 65 
644 Harvard Law Review 221 65348 Mo 1199 (1942) 
' 
' 
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publication of a woman's picture with an article about a 
physical ailment for which she was being treated in a 
hospital was the basis of the suit, 
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The defendant, publisher of !!!!, a weekly news maga-
zine, printed an article which carried the title "Starving 
Glutton." The story read: 
One night last week pretty Mrs. Dorothy Barber of 
Kansas City grabbed a candy bar, ~acked up some clothes, 
and walked to General Hoa~ital, I want to stay here," 
she said between bites. I want to eat all the tlme, 
1 can finish a normal meal and be back in the kitchen in 
ten minutes eating again." 
Dr. R. K. Simpson immediately peeked her oft to a 
ward, ordered a big meal from the hospital kitchen while 
he questioned Mrs. Barber. He found that although she 
had eaten enough in the past year to teed a family of 
ten, abe had lost 25 pounds, After preliminary examina-
tion Dr. Simpson thought that Mrs. Barber's pancreas 
might be functioning abnormally, that it might be burning 
up too much sugar in her blood and somehow causing an 
excess flow of digestive juices, which sharpened her 
appet1 te. 
' While he made painstaking laboratory tests and dis-
!i 
cussed the advisability of a rare operation, Mrs. Barber 
lay in bed and ate,66 
Under a close-up picture of Mrs. Barber, who was 
shown in the hospital bed, were the captions, "Insatiable 
Eater Barber" and "She Eats for 'l'en." 
The defendant showed that the article was published 
~: in a section of the magazine called "Medicine." The purpose 
of this section was to give the public medical news and 
I~ 
!I 
I) 
66~ •• 1203 
I' 
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developments in terms which could be understood by and in a 
' way which would be interesting to lay readers. 
:: 
' 
' 
Mrs. Barber charged that she not only refused per-
i mission to have her picture taken, but asked that the entire 
report be left out of the publication. She stated that the 
picture was taken by one photographer while the other tried 
''in vain to persuade her to such publicity. The court said: 
Certainly if there is any right of privacy at all, 
it should include the right to obtain medical treatment 
at home or in a hospital for an individual's personal 
condition (at least if it is not contagious or dangerous 
to others) without personal publicity. 
Ths court continued by pointing out that it was not 
necessary to give the name of the patient in order to give 
medical information to the public as to the symptoms, nature, 
causes or results of bar ailment, The fact that the picture 
was titled "Starving Glutton" indicated to the court that 
the article was not solely for the information of the public 
but was written as enjoyable and entertaining reading matter 
as well. The court added: 
Whatevar the limits of the right of privacy may be, 
it seems clear that it must include the right to have 
information given to or gained by a physician in the 
treatment of an individual'• personal ailment kept from 
publication which would state his name 1g connection 
therewith without such person's consent. 7 
In concluding, the court reasoned that although the 
press, tabloids or newsreel companies have a right to take 
67~ •• 1204 
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·; 
J and use pictures of persons in public places, certainly any 
I 
right of privacy ought to proteo' a person from publication 
1 of a picture taken without consent while ill or in bed for 
·j treatment and recuperat!ot.. 
:; 
Again, a contradiction exists between this case and 
the Metter case, in which the husband in an attempt to pro-
tect his own privacy could not restrain publication of his 
wife's photograph after she committed suicide. Time pleaded 
that it had used the article as a matter of news in which 
the public was interested, Public interest in this case was 
much less morbid than in the case of the dead wife. There-
fore, there would seem to be less justification for mental 
suffering on Mrs. Barber's count than on Mrs. Metter's hus-
band's. The jury granting relief to Mrs. Barber was advised 
by the court to decide the case conaiderlng whether interest 
of the public in her illness was "proper." If this 1s a 
consideration of the right of privacy at common law, why 
wasn't the court asked to consider whether the public's 
; interest in a suicide victim and the grieved, .stunned bus-
'~ 
i! 
:! 
I 
! 
band was "proper" or not? 
Still another unanswered question was brought to 
light in a 1940 case in Pennsylvania involving a charge of 
invasion of privacy by photograpb7. In Calyman v. Berstein, 6S;i 
6838 Pa D & C $43 
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;; the ta'king of a picture without publication was held to be a 
violation of one's right of privacy. The court recognizing 
the right nt common law added a new characteristic to the 
doctrine, one not suggestsrl by the original treatise by 
Warren and Brandeis. The Pennsylvania court established 
that th~ right of privacy may be invaded by a single agency. 
,, It would not require mass publication. 
In this case, a husband and wife sought to enjoin a 
physicial from developing certain prints of films and from 
using them in any manner and to make the doctor give them to 
! 
, the couple. The wife charged that the doctor had taken the 
photographs while employed as her private physician. ~~ile 
she was in a sem.!.-conscious condition, tha physician, with-
out thft permission of either of the plaintiffs, took the 
pictures of her showing the facial diafiguration resulting 
from her illness. 
The court affirmed the existence of the right of pri-
vacy and held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the in-
junction regardless of whether or not there had been publi-
cation of the pictures by the defendant. 
In granting relief the court referred back to the 
old English common law which recognized eavesdropping as a 
:: 
'i 
.I 
!I 
q 
! 
misdemaanor: 
Suppose the defendant had tapped a telephone wire 
and listened to a converaation of plaintiff or had 
obtained possession of her private diary and examined 
,, 
12$ 
its content, or in any one of numerous ways been guilty 
of eavesdropping. There would be no publication under 
the detini tlon urged by the defendant in his argument, 
yet in all these acts there is a common characteristic, 
they were done without authority or consent and the very 
act of the wrongdoer without conveyance of the thought 
or other property of the victim to another human agent 
constituteg an invasion of the individual's right to be 
let alone. 9 
Thus, there is added to the common law interpretation 
of the right of privacy the theory that publication to one 
person can constitute a violation of the right. Whether 
this would be true under statutory law has not been decided 
,r upon in atatea maintaining statutes concerning the right of 
privacy. (New York, Utah and Virginia.) 
Several principles concerning the right of privacy 
and its restriction on photography at common law were brought 
out in a case in the California courts in 1951. In Gill v. 
Curtis Publishing Company,70 a couple sued charging an inva-
sion of their privacy by the publication without their con-
sent of a photograph in a magazine. The couple had been 
seated in their ice cream store, the husband's arm around 
his wife, when a photographer took a photograph of them. 
Later the picture appeared in an issue of Harper's Bazaar 
magazine with a short article atating these couples were 
"immortalized in a moment of tenderness" affirming the poets' 
hypothesis that "the world would not revolve without love." 
69Ibid •• 547 7°38 A.C. 277 (Cal. App. 19$2) 
'I 
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The same picture later appeared in the Ladies ~ Journal 
with permission of and credit to Hearst, the publisher of 
Harper's Bazaar. This time the picture was used to illus-
trate an article on "the wrong kind of love"--"love at first 
sight" and "founded on 100 per cent sex attraction.n71 
A long enough time had elapsed so that the couple 
could not sue Bazaar. They now sued both Curtis and Hearst.72 
·! 
' The court telt that the picture was used tor purposes 
ot trade and that professional models could have been used 
instead. It appeared clear that the article was more fiction 
than news. Yet the implication extended to other situations 
as viewed by an outraged California press. The California 
f Newspaper Publisher's Association joined in a plea for a 
rehearing. They asked whether, under such a rule as the 
court had laid down, a newspaper could publish a news photo-
graph of a homecoming Korean veteran hug~ing his girl, or 
would that be restricted too?73 
Although this latter objection seems rather weak, it 
stood up in the Court of Appeals of California when the 
lower court's decision to grant relief to the couple was 
reversed. The Appeals Court, in discussing its reversal 
71~ •• 278 
72Norris Davis, Journalism guarterli, 22• £!!., p. 186 
73Th!.2,. 
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1 noted that the pose was voluntarily assumed in what was at 
least a semi-public place, The court declared t~at the 
picture would not shock "ordinary decency." 
The higher court's opinion was a victory for the 
press, but it is difficult to see that the law was made any 
clearer. 
The press argued that if a couple could not be photo-
graphed in a public place to illustrate a social institution 
' (true love), then where could the photographer seek his sub-
ject for a spontaneous view of "the passing parade," The 
court, in upholding this argument seemed to indicate that a 
person participating in an activity in a public place auto-
matically sheds his cloak of privacy even to the point of 
relinquishin~ his right to the use of his name or picture 
for commercial purposes. 
However, in just such a circumstance, another court 
decided at common law that the publisher of a picture had no 
right to use the photograph evan though the subject was a 
'; quasi-public figure because of hia poai tion in the United 
States Army. In Continental Optical Company v. Reed,74 the 
plaintiff was a member of a mobile optical unit abroad. A 
picture was taken of him to be used in recruiting pamphlets 
i' 
'I 
i 
I 
by the Army. 
7486 NE 2d 306 
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The plaintiff as a civilian was the owner of the Con-
.i tinental Optical Company, a business he intended to return 
to when completing his Army assignment. Clifford F. Reed, 
the defendant, was also in the optical lanse manufacturing 
business. When the picture of the Army officer performing 
hie duty as a member of the mobile optical unit was published 
in the States, the defendant decided to use it to advertise 
his business. He did so without consent from either the 
Army or the plaintiff.7S 
The plaintiff charged that the use of his picture to 
advertise Reed's business made the photograph valueless for 
use in his own optical company. 
Reed answered that the plaintiff, as a member of the 
armed forces was a public personage and thus his activities 
were not enveloped in privacy. Also, he said that previous 
publication by the Army left him free to use the picture. 
The court ruled that the right to publish the picture 
was not forfeited just because the picture had once been 
published. It was noted, however, that the rights to pub-
lish the picture never belonged to the plaintiff, but instead 
to the United States Army. The court issued an injunction to 
stop further use of the picture, but refused to grant special 
:: damages because: 
==#======·-=-=--- -- === 
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' 
When he (plaintiff) seeks special damages because 
someone has used his photograph for a purpose he 
intended for himself, he must
6
show that he had such 
right himself to begin with.7 
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It is interesting to note here that the case paral-
lels the Gill couple's "love at first sight" case in that 
neither publication complained of was a first publication. 
Rather, in both cases, the picture used was taken from 
another source. Both parties were considered to have bean 
participating in quasi-public activities. Yet, the couple 
were exposed to possible further publication without con-
sent, whereas the soldier was granted an injunction to stop 
further publication. However, in the couple's case no 
importance was placed on whose right it was originally to 
print the picture, while in the soldier's case the decision 
rested almost entirely on this consideration. 
Such inconsistencies add conviction to the theory 
that, unless uniformity is attained, as under a statute, the 
privacy doctrine will become a dubious right, both for the 
people seeking its protection and for communicators attempt-
ing to avoid the violation of it. 
Recognition at common law of an invasion of privacy 
by photography does seem to hold one consistent viewpoint. 
By exposing one's countenance to public view, the right to 
76Ibid., 309 
" 
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;i, protest photography is waived. However, few suffer from 
;'. exposure of their picture as much as from exposure of 
intimacies of their history accompany1ng the picture. These 
special circumstances surrounding the picture are left to 
the precedent and tradition of the common law courts to be 
interpreted as actionable or not. It is the spectrum of 
interpretations that the communicator must consider, 
acknowledging as many exceptions as there are rules. 
==~--~-~·-·=· ==*===== ~-~ ~~~--~~~ ·--~-==--·=--=-=== - ----- ---- .---- . 
" 
VI. PROTECTION FOR NAME AT COMMON LAW 
UNDE'R THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
"Nothing so exclusively belongs to a man or is so 
:I personal and valuable to him as his name. 11 This quotation 
from a 1924 case in the state of Washington has often been 
cited as the principle on which to base relief for an inva-
sion of privacy at common law. 
Cases have often entered the courts asking relief 
for the use of a person's name in advertising. There are 
additional circumstances arising from time to time where a 
person feels the use of his name has deprived him of more 
than commercial benefit. In these cases, feelings or repu-
tation have been considered to heve been damaged. Only at 
common law have there been recognitions of an invasion of 
privacy by the use of one's name causing damage to personal 
feelings. 
It is almost ironical that the Washington case so 
often referred to as establishing the individual's rieht to 
the sole use of his name, did not mention any rlght of pri-
vacy. The case, LaFollette v. Henkle, established the fact 
that great damage could be done to one who was deprived of 
the rights to his name.77 
77state ex rel. LaFollette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash 86 
(1924) 
• 
:· 
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The ease involved the use of the plaintiff's name 
without permission in connection with a party ticket at the 
time the plaintiff was a candidate for President of the 
United States. The court in its precedent-setting decision 
stated·: 
Nothing so exclusively belongs to a man or is so 
personal and valuable to him as his name. His reputa-
tion and character he has built up are inseparably 
connected w!th it. Others can have no right to use it 
without his express consent, and he has a right to go 
into any court at any ti~e to enjoin or prohibit any 
unauthorized use of 1t.7~ 
One of the most famous eases where an individual did 
exactly what the above judge suggested occurred in the Cali-
fornia courts when a woman finally carried her complaint to 
the District Court of Appeals. In Kerby v. ~ Roach 
Studlos,79 a woman charged that great damage to her feelings, 
health and reputation had been caused by a letter circulated 
with her name signed as "your ectoplasmic playmate, Marlon 
Kerby." The court recognized a definite invasion of her 
right of privacy by the sending of the letter which read: 
Dearest: 
Don't breath it to a soul, but I'm back in Los 
Angeles and more curious than aver to see you. 
Remember how I cut up about a year ago? Well, I'm 
raring to go again, and believe me I'm in the mood 
for fun. 
Let's renew our acquaintanceship and I promise you 
7953 Cal App 2d 207 
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an evening you won't forget, Meet me in front of 
Warner's Downtown Theatre at 7th and Hill on Thursday, 
Just look for a girl with a gleam tn her eye, a smile 
on her lips and mischief on her mind! 
Fondly, 
Your ectoplasmic playmate, 
Marion Kerby80 
The letter was sent in the Los Angeles area by the 
Roach Studios as a part of a promotion scheme for a movie : ~
released by tham in which the chief feminine character was 
named Marion Kerby,81 
The studios did not know or check to see if there was 
P anyone by that name living in the area, as there happened to 
be, 
Marion Kerby was a resident of Los Angeles and well 
known in her field as a concert singer and collector of 
American folk-lore. She charged that the letter, which was 
reproduced on pink stationery written in a feminine hand in 
:1 green ink and sent to 1,000 men, caused her unending embar-
i' rassment and suffer1ng.82 
,: 
The court in recognizing an invasion of privacy said: 
Here the plaintiff was, without her consent, plucked 
from her regular routine of life and thrust before the 
world, or at least 1,000 of its persons as the author 
of a letter not written by her and of a nature to at 
:: least east doubt on her moral character, and this was 
80rbid. 1 210 821.£!.!! •• 212 
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done in a manner to eall down on her a traln of highly 
undesirable eonaequences. This constituted as strong 
an invasion of the right of privacy as any of those 
described in the eaaes.tl3 
This judge's opinion was upheld in a Florida case 
which supported the opinion that a person's name cannot be 
separated from his personality and used without permission. 
When such use results in undesirable and unwarranted public-
ity the individual's right of privacy has been violated.84 
In this ease the plaintiff did not allege that the use of 
her name and life history in a novel was without consent. 
i' She did, however, charge an invuion of privacy by the !den-
' 
1: tifi.cation of her with the character described. The particu-
B 
' 
lar passage found objectionable in the book read: 
I cannot decide whether ahe ehould have been a man 
or a mother. She combines the more violent character-
istics of both and those who aak for or accept her 
manifold ministrations think nothing of being cursed 
loudly at the very instant ot being tenderly ted,
85 clothed, nursed or guided through their troubles. 
Although the judge thought that the book portrayed 
' the plaintiff as a fine and attractive personality, he noted 
that it was nevertheless a vivid and intimate character 
sketch and would constitute cause for aotion.86 
The court pointed out that in the book the author did 
not once mention the surname of the plaintiff nor the village 
83!121£ •• 213 84caaon v. Baskin 159 Fla 30 (1947) 
86Ibid. 
ii 
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!j in which she 11 ved. Only when the plaintiff brought suit 
1: 
'i was the public definitely told that the "Zelma" in the bonk 
1: 
!) 
!i was Zelma Cason of Island Grove in Alachua County, Florida, 
:i 
: ~ 
The court stated: 
By bringing this unusual type action against a well-
known author, which of course, she had a perfect right 
to do, plaintiff thereby positively identified herself 
as Zelma rsferrea to in that widely circulated book and 
added greatly to that8~ublicity which she alleges was so disdainful to her. 7 
However, even a public figure, according to the court 
would be entitled to a degree of self-publication without 
relinquishing this right to others, 
A person may himself sell the manifestations of hie 
personality, as a professional actor or singer does, or 
he may display them to a chosen few or cherish them in 
private, If another wrongly breaches his legal right 
to his own personality he is guilty of invading the 
individual's right of prlvacy:tiB 
This viewpoint hardly coincides with the court's 
reasoning in the Martin or Cohen caaes,89 where the actress 
and prizefighter were deemed to have waived their right of 
privacy by their choice or profession, However, the above 
decision follows the judge's reasoning in the Kerby case, 
where in spite of her profession as an entertainer, she waa 
given relief from damage to her feelings by an invasion of 
privacy. 
B7Ibid., 35 88Ibid. 
89cr. footnotes $0, 60 
·-- ---·_:-:_-:::- ----- ::· 
The Cason and Kerby cases are the most noteworthy 
, examples of decisions at common law granting redress for ~ ! 
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injury to feelings alone where an individual's name has been 
used without consent. 
An Oregon court discussed at length the necessity for 
a recognition of an individual's right to his name as a part 
of his personality. In Hinnish v. Meier Frank Company,90 
the court said: 
As to names, it is the general rule that a person 
has no such exclusive right to the use of his own name 
as to prevent the assumption of its use by another, 
But it is different When one's own name is used in such 
a way as to amount to unfair competition. In connection 
with questions of that kind, a man's name is said to be 
his own property,91 
This case involved signing a man's name without his 
knowledge to a telegram which was aent to the Governor of 
Oregon asking him to veto a bill. The defendants, who owned 
a mercantile business and maintained as part of it an opti-
cal department sent the following telegram: 
Governor Charles A, Sprague 
1939 Feb 28 PM 9 36 
There is no demand for Optical Bill Seventy except 
by those who are financially interested in its passing. 
It is not a bill set out by the people. I urge you to 
veto it, 
George Hinnish 2810 NE 49 Ave92 
It was noted that with the passage of this bill, the 
defendants would be prohibited from fitting and selling 
9°166 Or 482 9lib1d,, 484 
ii 
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:; optical lenses. 
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George Hinnish, the plaintiff, was a Civil Service 
employee ana thereby prohibited by statute from engaging in 
political activities, He charged that the defendants, by 
sending the telegram, endangered his job and his right to 
receive a pension upon retirement. Although the court noted 
the property right in an individual's name, it added that 
there was no necessity to search for a right of property or 
contract or a relation of confidence. What the court was 
seeking to establish was whether a right of privacy, 
distinct and of itself and not incidental to some other long 
recognized right would be accepted by the court. 
This was the first case recognizing the right of pri-
vacy in Oregon, To the argument of the defense that the law 
of the state recognized no right of privacy as a violation 
of one's personal feelings the court said: 
The objection is urged that the law does not give 
redress for mental anguish alone, and that no other 
damage is alleged in the complaint in this case. The 
rule invoked is the law in this state. But it is well 
settled that where the wrongful act constitutes an 
infringement of a legal right, mental suffering may be 
recovered for, if it is the direct, proximate and 
natural result of the wrongful act. Violation of the 
right of privacy is a wrong of that character,93 
The plaintiff was granted relief for an invasion of 
his privacy by the use of his name causing mental suffering 
and embarrassment. 
93,!PM., 486 
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The three cases thus far cited are the most note-
I! 
i! worthy examples of decisions at common law granting :redress 
" 
tor injury to feelings alone where an individual's name has 
been used without consent. 
These cases are similar in that they all deal with 
injury to personal feelings as a cause for action under a 
charge of invasion of privacy. Caaea at common lew involv-
ing use of name have entered the courts charging an invasion 
ot privacy simply by the~ of one's name. 
In Goodyear !!£! and Rubber Company v. Vande:rgr1ft,94 
the plaintiff recovered on the grounds of invasion of privacy 
because the defendant represented himself as the plaintiff 
in an attempt to make some sales. By such a misrepresents-
!! 
'' tion, the Goodyear Tire Company lll8nager charged that he was 
deprived of the right to the enjoyment of his name and repu-
tation. The court acknowledged the invasion of the individ-
ual'a right to be let alone by the unwarranted use of his 
name and business reputation. 
A denial of the exclusive right to one's name was 
decided when the name had been placed on a document that had 
become a public record. In Johnson v. Se:ripps Publishtng 
Companv,95 the plaintiff could not recover for sn invasion 
of his privacy by the publication of his name in the paper 
9452 Ga App 662 (1936) 9518 Ohio 372 (1940) 
:: 
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!: 
!l as part of a nominating pet1 tion of candida tea for the 
:I 
!i ;, COIIIIIIUllist Party ticket. 
;i 
Recovery was denied since the statutes governing 
' 
'' such nomina tlng psti tiona were open as publi e record and 
:: 
therefore divested of any private character. In printing 
the nominating petition the publisher could not be invading 
the plaintiff's privacy since nons existed in regards to his 
name the moment be placed his signature on the petition.96 
The common law recognition of the right of privacy 
has granted in most instances that one's name is the most 
distinctive phase of his personality aside from the physical 
!I body itself. Flagrant use of one 'a name by communica tiona 
,. 
'! 
! 
:! 
media under the guise of "news" has not been allowed but has 
been established as a just and independent cause for action. 
:: 
If"'\ 
VII, SUMMARY OF CODOlf LAW RECOGNITION 
i! OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
Recognition of a new right at common law has long 
been known as a slow and often frustrating process, It can 
be frustrating because of the hesitancy of judges to estab-
lish precedent• which might later prove to be based on 
extremes, However, the increase in recognitlon of the right 
of privacy at common law has been phenomenal since the turn 
of the een tury, 
In the District of Columbia and in 24 of the 27 states 
where cases asking recognition of the right of privacy have 
i' bean brought into the courts, acceptance of tho doctrine has 
been established,97 
II ,, 
The major drawback to the common law recognition of 
the right is one often arising when a new right is being 
established by judicial recognition, The lack of uniformity 
97Recognition ~f the right of privacy has been 
granted in: Alabama, Arizona, California, District of 
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Mon-
tana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and 
Virginia, This list was compiled in a study by Frank Thayer 
and Mary o. Eastwood in American Jurisprudence, Vol. 4.1, 
p. 927. At the time of the compilation, 19$1, Rhode Island 
was not included in the list, but haa since granted recog-
nition. Denial of the right has been made in new York, 
Texas, Washington, and Wiaconsin. Denial by New York has 
been made only at common law, since the right is protected 
in that state by a statute as shown in this thesis. 
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'; in defin1 tion among the various jurisdictions leaves many 
:i 
., 
li 
" que a tiona unanswered, particularly for the com>nUnica tions 
•' 
media which are moat often affected by recognition of the 
,, right. 
,, 
When inconsistencies appear in the opinions given by 
various courts at common law, the argument is offered that 
natural justice and the epecific needs of society in whlch 
we live must prevail over a desire for generalities. The 
common law's capacity to discover and apply remedies for 
, acknowledged wrongs without waiting on legislation is often 
offered as one of its cardinal virtues.98 
,, 
1: 
'i 
j, 
i, 
' 
It has been noted that the courts cannot, of course, 
lay down any rule they choose. Sir Frederick Pollock said 
in "The Expans:!.on of the Common Law" the t the courts may 
supplement and enlarge the law as they find it, or rather 
they IIIUst do so from time to time as the novelty of ques-
tiona coming before them may require. They must not reverse 
what has been said.99 
Concerning the right of privacy, it has been observed 
that the courts do reverse what hae been said, and thus 
cont:!'adtc tiona such as the ones found in this s tud.v result. 
98smith and Prosser, Cases and Other Materials, 
{Brooklyn, The Foundation Press, Inc7, 1951), p. 1647 
99Ibid.' p. 1646 
::· 
Hope for uniformity in the recognition of the privacy 
ii 
;i doctrine may lie only in the passing of legislation defining 
;! 
:! 
' tha limits of the right. Until such time as either legisla-
tion or further r.:~fining of judicial law confines the right 
to a consistent interpretation, the communications media can 
' expect to find itself forever treading on the "private 
ground" of the individual personal! ties who collectlvely 
form the news-demanding public. 
' '! 
• 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
This study has attempted to trace the development of 
the right of privacy and its entrance into the courts both 
at common law and under statutory law. Some general princi-
plea concerning the privacy doctrine can be assumed after 
this examination of the decisions handed down in various 
jurisdictions where communications media were charged with a 
violation of the right. 
One of the most significant discoveries resulting 
·, 
'i from a study of cases involving the right of privacy is the 
:i 
:! 
·i persistence of the principles first laid down by Warren and 
" 
:i Brandeis. These general principles have not baen listed 
:! 
i, collectively in tbs study to thia point, but have been 
referred to as a case supporting each was reviewed. The 
seven principles seem to run through decisions in juris-
dictions which have recognized the right of privacy as well 
as those which have not. The authors' list suggested that 
the right of privacy be limited to the following principles: 
1. The right of privacy does not prohibit any publi-
cation of matter which is of public or general 
interest. 
2. The right of privacy does not prohibit the com-
munication of any matter, though in its nature 
~rivst.e, when the publication is made under 
ch'cums tan cas which would render it a privileged 
communication according to the law of slander 
or libel. 
" 
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). The law would probably not grant any redress for 
the invasion of privacy by oral publication in 
the absence of special damages. 
4. The right to privacy ceases upon the publication 
of the facts by the individual, or with his 
consent. 
5. The truth of the matter published does not afford 
a defense. 
6. The absence of "malice" in the publisher does not 
afford a defense. 
7. It is an in~ident of the person and not of 
property.1 
It is bewildering to note that these general princi-
ples have bean a common strain in the recognition of the 
right of privacy throughout the country, and yet there have 
been inconsistent decisions in the individual courts. 
It has been shown that many states do not agree on 
what is permissible for publication and what is not. This 
difference in opinion poses a problem for all connected with 
the field of communications. A reporter, publisher, broad-
caster, or photographer successfully pursuing his individual 
profession in one state might find that in another he would 
ii be constantly under legal fire for violation of a right 
" " 
which he had never known existed in his former jurisdiction. 
Granted, there is a need to prevent the communications 
media from putting their power to base uses, with complete 
immunity and without regard to the damage done to personal 
feelings and sensibilities. 
; 14 Har;;rd Law Review 198 
. ~~- . -··-··- - -- --·- -· -··. ·- ·····-· -- ---
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i' 
However, where the prevention of such a wrong leads 
to the nebulous and often illogical interpretations as those 
offered at common law, a threat to the field of communica-
tions is made. The threat is dangerous both for the finan-
cial damage it can cause the media in law suits, and for the 
ominous hint of "censorship" it implies. 
The courts themselves have recognized the danger the 
right of privacy imposes on freedom of the press. Judge 
Nordbye in the Berg case noted that: 
Certainly this Court should proceed with cautlon 
before it attempts to sit as a censor and to interfere 
with the tradit~onal right of the Preas to print all 
printable news. 
The idea of harmonizing press freedom with the indi-
vidual right to be let alone was capsuled by the courts into 
a "news" theory. It was usually held that the public's 
right to know should supersede the individual's desire to be 
let alone. However, mere use as news was no longer a defense 
for the media. They could be sate only when there was a 
"legitimate" or "proper" public interest. 
For example, in the "Insatiable Eater" case,3 !1m! 
magazine's appeal was refused, the court not,ng the conflict 
of public interest with the right of privacy. The story 
Supp 
2Berg v. 
9$7 
3Ibid. 
-
Minneapolis ~ Tribune Company 79 F 
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itself may have carried information of some public interest, 
but the way 1.n which 1 t was reported was not "proper." 
Thus, although the law allows the media to print what 
!1 is 11 leg1 tima te" or "proper," it is actually left to the 
court to decide the question, and usually after the damage 
has already been done. 
It is in this more difficult area of publication, 
claiming to convey information of value to the public, that 
the real question of privacy arises. Is it of public value 
or just for the gain of the publisher? This again, the 
court must decide. It is here that the right of privacy 
threatens to be a limitation of press freedom. For it sub-
jects all mass communications media to suits against which 
they have no defense. The basic defense must be that the 
information was of value to the public, but it ia the court 
that decides this. 
It is the illusive boundary by which the law divides 
the articles and portraits that may be published with impu-
nity from those that are forbidden which creates uncertainty 
in the mind of the communicator. 
What then, may the communicator ~o to avoid bringing 
chargee of violation of privacy upon himself or hie pub-
lisher? 
Firat, as in all instances of staying within the 
boundaries of the law, the media should require its staff 
to be familiar with the right in question. This should 
involve examination of cases charging violations of the 
right, particularly those pertinent to the particular state. 
Second, all communica tlon releases containing any 
information at all questionable as a possible liability 
should be reviewed by the publication's counsel before 
dissemination. 
These precautions cannot insure the communication 
media absolutely against violations of the right of pri.vacy 
since the decision is ultimately left up to a court. The 
court, in handing down a decision may in no way agree with 
the judgment of the well-informed staff or the counsel which 
took the precautionary measures. 
A law suit is expensive, regardless of the outcome. 
It can often be expensive to the reputation of the mec1um, 
as well as to ita financial status. The field of communica-
tiona has long had to cope with the ever-present threat of 
libel suits--a threat which has often been consldered an 
inherent risk of the business. Now an additional cause for 
legal action against the field haa risen, one which has 
become well established within the past half century. Its 
disappearance, or gradual withdrawal is not foreseeable. It 
': is a restriction on the field of communications which must 
be accepted and coped with. 
The moat justifiable proteat that the media could 
=====· --·---··-· .. ·-··-·-------·-·· .. 
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make would be against the nebulous and intangible definition 
of the right QS has been demonstrated in past cases. Only 
under statutory law. as in New York. has any trace of con-
sistency been prevalent. An examination of the cases has 
shown support of the atatement by the judge jn the Brents 
case.4 who noted that there has been no concrete definition. 
However. under a statute there might at least be. if 
not a concrete. a consistent definition of the right. 
Common law is often referred to as being "forever 
young," able to expand and grow with the social conditi.ons. 
However, it appears that in the case of the right to be let 
alone the doctrine has grown faster than the common law 
which has been affording it protection. In some oases, 
several centuries have elapsed while a right was being 
recognized in various stages at common law (as in the case 
of libel). However, the fast and fUrious pace marking the 
1, expansion of communication devices has caused the rl~":ht of 
!! 
privacy to be brought to an early peak in its demand for 
II recognition. 
r! The diverse and often puzzling reasoning of the 
courts in deciding privacy cases supports the theory that 
legislation governing the right. if not on a national level, 
at least within each state is desirable, if not necessary in 
preventing such violations. 
4cf. footnote 24, Chapter III 
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With at least the "reasonable" limits which statutory 
law could give to the rieht of privacy, there could be af-
forded the protection for the individual aga:lnst the invasion 
of his private life. At t~e same time statutory law could 
eons is tently define the 11m1 ta tiona imposed by the right on 
,,,r coiQII\\lllica tiona so there could continue to be the precious 
tree dissemination of information without constant fear of 
II 
unknowingly violstin~ the law. 
In order to preserve rights for himself, one muet aid 
in preserving them for all. This requires cooperation with 
others. Judge Hyde noted that freedom of the press was not 
created merely for the benefit of the press, hut because it 
is essential to the preservation of free government and 
progress of civilization.$ 
Likewise, natural law did not create individual rights 
without considering the benefit the entire society would de-
rive from the creation. Privacy, as a natural right, and 
freedom of communications are both ult:l.mstely aimed at bet-
tering the progress of civilization. There is no reason why 
they cannot be harmonized if the law makers act as cautious 
censors, simultaneously protecting the 1nd1 vidual' a sens:l.-
bilitiea and preserving an untrammeled press as a vital source 
of pubUo informs t1on. 
$Barber v. Time Incorporated, 348 Mo 1149 (1942) 
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